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 The Enduring Ambiguities of Antitrust Liability for 
Worker Collective Action 
Sanjukta M. Paul* 
This Article examines the regulation, by antitrust law, of collective 
action by low-wage workers who are classified as independent 
contractors, and who therefore presumptively do not receive the benefit 
of the labor exemption from antitrust law.  Such workers find 
themselves in the position of most workers prior to the New Deal: at 
once lacking labor protections, yet exposed to antitrust liability for 
organizing to improve their conditions.  I argue that this default rule is 
the legacy of a problematic history that is taken for granted by the 
contemporary antitrust framework. 
In Part I, I show that the threat of antitrust liability is a powerful 
constraint upon contemporary independent contractor workers’ own 
ability to take action to address their working conditions.  In Part II, I 
trace the application of antitrust liability to worker collective action to 
the time before the labor exemption, arguing that pre-New Deal courts 
imported fundamentally hierarchical and coercive tenets from the 
common-law tradition into the fledgling antitrust law in order to apply 
it to contain worker organizing, thereby creating tensions with their 
own freedom of contract principles.  In Part III, I show how the legal 
framework of the labor exemption reinforced the underlying assumption 
that antitrust regulates worker collective action, even as it immunized 
most workers from such liability (so long as they continued to be 
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15_PAUL FINAL .DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/2/2016  10:19 AM 
970 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  47 
considered employees).  In Part IV, I argue that the modern framework 
for antitrust does not compel the continued application of this default 
rule, and indeed supplies materials for a fresh, more balanced 
reconsideration of it. 
Ultimately, the situation of these workers is a test of what antitrust 
fundamentally says about labor, absent a specific exemption.  Because 
that exemption is currently rooted in the New Deal network of labor 
regulation, antitrust’s treatment of labor becomes a baseline for critical 
conversations about how to reform our current framework of labor 
regulation—in the same way that it was the baseline for those 
conversations prior to the New Deal itself.  In particular, antitrust 
functions as an outer limit for any such reform, and also for specific 
policy proposals to address the increasing prevalence of working 
relationships outside the bounds of employment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the winter of 1999, following a series of strikes at America’s ports 
aimed at improving poor working conditions and low pay, a number of 
individual truck drivers found themselves served with subpoenas by the 
U.S. Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), which was investigating their 
potential participation in a price-fixing conspiracy.1  These men, who 
were working punishing hours yet hardly breaking even, were 
grassroots leaders in an episode of collective action among low-wage 
workers that was somewhat unusual for the period.  Their participation 
and leadership in these expressions of solidarity was the basis for the 
investigation. 
 
1. See infra Part I.B (discussing antitrust as a barrier to worker collective action). 
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In this Article, I examine the origins of the rule that antitrust law 
largely prohibits collective action by workers who fall outside the 
bounds of employment, and who therefore presumptively do not receive 
the benefit of the labor exemption from antitrust law.2  The threat that 
organizing for decent wages and working conditions will be prosecuted 
as price-fixing is a powerful constraint upon such workers’ ability to 
take action to change their circumstances.  Antitrust has historically 
structured the nature and content of labor regulation in this country, 
and it is currently poised to do so again in a new form. It did so 
directly and punitively in the Gilded Age.  It did so indirectly and 
somewhat under the surface during the New Deal era.  In today’s 
deregulation era, it is of increasing significance in regulating workers 
who fall outside the bounds of the National Labor Relations Act 
(“NLRA”)3 (and other employment and labor law), as a limit upon 
new forms of labor regulation that would bring these nontraditional 
workers within their scope, and as a potential baseline for labor law 
reform generally.  In contrast to the neoclassical interpretation of 
antitrust, which holds that the doctrine is justified on economic 
grounds independent of politics and moral norms, I adopt the 
perspective that antitrust has essential and irreducible political or 
normative content.  While the neoclassical interpretation has 
certainly been challenged, it still holds great sway as the official 
position of most courts and the mainstream of antitrust scholarship.  
Antitrust’s normative content can specifically be seen in its 
relationship to labor, which has changed over time according to the 
specific policy project and broader norms that held purchase among 
decision makers. 
Antitrust law had its origins in a republican outlook that viewed 
emerging concentrations of economic and political power, enabled 
by the rise of the modern business corporation, as highly 
problematic.  The statute was not, originally, intended to apply to 
workers’ or farmers’ collective action. The policy project envisioned 
by the legislators—breaking up concentrations of economic power—
would in fact be undermined by preventing cooperation among less-
powerful economic actors who were affected by large business 
combinations.4 
 
2. See infra Part III.C.2. 
3. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29 
U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012)). 
4. See infra Part II.B (discussing the Sherman Act and its relationship to labor). 
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This original orientation took a sharp turn in the courts, where a 
different and somewhat competing policy project, that of building the 
national market society, held greater sway.  That project benefited 
from a compliant and reliable workforce.  In order to use antitrust to 
prevent and punish worker organizing, Gilded Age courts made use 
of an equivocation in the concept of “free trade,” and drew on 
fundamentally hierarchical and coercive assumptions regarding workers 
from the common law of labor regulation.5  In purporting to implement 
parity between capital and labor under antitrust regulation, the courts 
actually relied upon status-based normative assumptions regarding 
workers qua workers.6 
These courts succeeded in making the presumptive illicitness of 
worker collective action the underlying, default position, against which 
the “labor exemption” to antitrust law would then be defined in the New 
Deal era.7  The law of the labor exemption in fact reified the 
classicists’ application of antitrust to worker collective action.  It also 
temporarily held the rule at bay, in service of the new policy project 
of the New Deal economy, which involved economic co-governance 
by business, the state, and organized labor.  Meanwhile, antitrust 
began to consolidate into its contemporary neoclassical economic 
form, disavowing direct consideration of social or moral norms and 
emphasizing economic efficiency.  As evidenced by 
contemporaneous policy commentary, the labor exemption was 
viewed by extreme neoclassicists as an unjustified instance of special 
treatment of labor, a deviation from scientific economic principles.   
The deregulation era beginning roughly in the late 1970s began to 
expose a growing number of workers to antitrust liability, in a 
reprisal of the Gilded Age version of the antitrust-labor intersection.  
The body of law—roughly, the neoclassical interpretation of price-
fixing—that tentatively comes to apply to these workers, prizes 
economic efficiency, disavows the social effects (and often even the 
economic effects) of its antitrust decisions, and certainly disavows 
moral considerations.  To the extent that moral considerations 
applicable to collective action (such as liberty interests in freedom of 
association and expression) are enshrined in other areas of law such 
as the First Amendment, it also keeps those at bay by insisting upon 
an over-solid distinction between the “economic” and “political” 
 
5. See infra Part II.C.3 (discussing early decisions applying the Sherman Act to workers). 
6. See id. 
7. See infra Part III (discussing the labor exemption). 
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spheres (precisely the distinction called into question by—among 
other things—the history of antitrust’s changing application to 
labor).  Yet, although neoclassical price-fixing law officially 
disavows moral and social considerations, it in fact relies upon such 
“extrinsic” considerations in many respects, often tacitly folded into 
invocations of “legitimate” competition,8 and it certainly does so in 
its relationship to worker collective action.9  Because how antitrust is 
to treat labor is, and always has been, a contingent policy decision 
involving irreducible normative content, I argue that the rule ought to 
be revisited in light of the specific moral, political, and economic 
concerns raised by worker collective action in pursuit of a decent 
livelihood. 
The literature has not previously addressed the development of this 
rule and its conceptual underpinnings through the various relevant areas 
of law and eras, although naturally many existing areas of scholarship 
bear upon the account.  The issue of antitrust liability and contemporary 
independent contractor workers has been flagged in the literature on 
contingent work, but has not been squarely addressed there.10  In its 
contemporary form, it has been addressed somewhat more squarely by 
scholars focused on trade, that is, antitrust law and market regulation, 
particularly as to specific trades or industries.11  Some relatively recent 
work in antitrust economics argues that collective action on the part of 
certain smaller market actors, including small businesses and 
independent contractors, ought to be permitted;12 other work in this area 
sets out the concept of ruinous competition, which may also have 
 
8. See infra Part IV.A (exploring the normative content of the price-fixing case law). 
9. I specifically argue, in Part IV.B, infra, that antitrust imports “extrinsic” normative 
considerations in the price-fixing doctrine generally, in the operation of what I call the 
professional privilege, and in the application of, or refusal to apply, First Amendment protection 
to worker collective action that is not otherwise protected by the labor exemption. 
10. See, e.g., Elizabeth Kennedy, Comment, Freedom from Independence: Collective 
Bargaining Rights for “Dependent Contractors,” 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 143 (2005) 
(noting potential antitrust liability for collective action by independent contractors). 
11. The collective economic action of independent contractor physicians in particular has 
received scholarly attention; the situation is something of a special case, given the complex 
regulatory structure within which it exists (which may itself create cartel-like benefits).  Elizabeth 
M. Devine, Physical Unionization: A Prescription for Modern Managed Care, 4 QUINNIPIAC 
HEALTH L.J. 39, 40 (2000). 
12. See Warren S. Grimes, The Sherman Act’s Unintended Bias Against Lilliputians: Small 
Players’ Collective Action as a Counter to Relational Market Power, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 195, 234 
(2001) (proposing a limited countervailing power defense for small players’ collective action).  
This argument relies upon a conception of market power whose status in the price-fixing doctrine 
is currently somewhat tenuous, but which has the potential to be revived, as further explored in 
Part IV.B.1, infra, and Part IV.B.3, infra. 
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application to independent contractor workers.13  I bring these insights 
together with historical considerations regarding the development of 
both antitrust and pre-New Deal labor regulation.  
The bulk of the literature on antitrust and labor generally, meanwhile, 
dates from during or shortly following the mid-century “normal 
science” period of the labor exemption,14 and is largely defined by its 
assumptions.  In particular, much of this literature is built, either 
expressly or indirectly, upon assumptions regarding labor unions’ size 
and strength (and relatedly, upon the economic significance of 
collective bargaining), which no longer hold.15  As a result, the 
literature is to a great extent focused upon collective bargaining policy 
and its antitrust implications, rather than upon unilateral worker 
collective action, and even the collective bargaining discussions tend to 
be conditioned by the assumption of labor union size and strength.16 
How antitrust will regulate unilateral worker collective action in the 
context of contingent work is an especially pressing topic, given its 
uncertain legal status, its increasing significance in the labor market,17 
and the significant constraints it is already placing upon these workers 
and their movements.18  This problem cannot be obviated by resolving 
the “misclassification” issue, familiar from labor and employment law, 
alone.19 
 
13. See, e.g., KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY & COMMON LAW 
EVOLUTION 94–98 (2003) (comparing the concept of “ruinous competition” between the 
Sherman Act and common law); Mark Grady, Toward a Positive Economic Theory of Antitrust, 
30 ECON. INQUIRY 225 (1992) (discussing the concept of “ruinous competition”). 
14. See infra Part III.C (discussing the “normal science” of the labor exception). 
15. See Ralph K. Winter, Collective Bargaining and Competition: The Application of Antitrust 
Standards to Union Activities, 73 YALE L.J. 14, 16 (1963) (“[U]nions are far more powerful and 
strategically entrenched today than at the time of Loewe v. Lawlor, and collective bargaining is a 
significant force shaping the economy.”); see also Randall Marks, Labor and Antitrust: Striking a 
Balance without Balancing, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 699, 701 (1986) (arguing that antitrust does not 
sufficiently constrain labor).  Marks almost exclusively assumes the actions of established labor 
unions, considers unilateral activity only cursorily, and states “the nonstatutory exemption,” 
which covers collective bargaining, “is most frequently at issue in labor/antitrust cases.”  Id.  
Even commentators expressing concern about the diminishing reach of the labor exemption tend 
to operate on this assumption, concerning themselves primarily with specific doctrinal border-
fixing issues.  Milton Handler & William C. Zifchak, Collective Bargaining and the Antitrust 
Law: The Emasculation of the Labor Exemption, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 459, 460 (1981). 
16. Winter, supra note 15; Marks, supra note 15; Handler & Zifchak, supra note 15; see also 
Elinor Hoffman, Labor and Antitrust Policy: Drawing a Line of Demarcation, 50 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1 (1983) (analyzing labor and antitrust policy). 
17. See infra Part I.C (discussing potential defendants). 
18. See infra Part I.B (discussing antitrust as a barrier to worker collective action). 
19. See infra Part I.D (discussing the intersection between labor and employment law). 
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But the implications of the question are not limited to contingent 
workers.  The situation of these workers is a test of what antitrust 
fundamentally says about labor, absent a specific exemption.  That 
exemption is currently rooted in the network of affirmative labor 
legislation.  As the functioning of that affirmative framework arguably 
declines and as discussion of modifying it or replacing it increases, 
antitrust’s treatment of labor may again become the baseline for those 
critical conversations—in the same way that it was prior to the New 
Deal itself, when avoiding antitrust’s grasp was one of the main aims of 
the labor movement.20  The specific assumption that workers’ right to 
organize for economic betterment is an “exemption” to be bargained 
for, perhaps by giving up other things, has implications far beyond 
independent contractor workers. 
I.  THE IMPACT OF ANTITRUST ON CONTEMPORARY INDEPENDENT 
CONTRACTOR WORKERS 
In today’s post-New Deal, “deregulation economy,”21 workers are 
often and increasingly relegated to labor relationships outside formal 
employment.  Collective action by workers who are classified as 
independent contractors, and who therefore presumptively do not 
receive the benefit of the labor exemption from antitrust law, may in 
theory, and has in scattered instances, drawn antitrust scrutiny.  As truck 
drivers, taxi drivers, home health care workers, artists, and others 
choose to organize in an effort to improve poor pay and working 
conditions, we may expect to see this issue addressed in the courts if 
and when one of these movements gains real power.  Regardless, the 
threat of antitrust liability already exercises profound constraints on 
these workers’ ability to organize.  Finally, as policy makers and 
advocates consider new schemes to organize and regulate work that 
falls outside the bounds of employment, antitrust may function as a 
limit on the regulatory possibilities (particularly in cases of local 
initiatives). 
 
20. The labor movement’s primary aim, more precisely, was avoiding the judiciary’s 
repression of worker collective action generally, whether accomplished by antitrust or by other 
bases for issuing injunctions in particular.  WILLIAM FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE 
AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 128–66 (1991).  However, very few of those other bases, many 
of them explicitly rooted in the older common-law tradition of worker regulation (described in 
Part II.A.2, infra), have survived to the present day, while antitrust has. 
21. I adopt this term to describe the economic policy paradigm that began to replace the New 
Deal framework starting in roughly the late 1970s.  I adopt the term for ease of reference, 
although this set of policies is often characterized not only by the withdrawal of certain types of 
regulation but by the extension of other sorts of regulation, often aimed at workers. 
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A.  The Struggle for Decent Work and Decent Pay as Price-Fixing 
The labor exemption currently immunizes most worker collective 
action from antitrust liability.  Employee status, much discussed in its 
impact on workers in terms of the receding reach of labor and 
employment law protections, is also the trigger for extending the grasp 
of antitrust regulation of workers’ autonomous collective action to 
better their working conditions.  In other words, a phenomenon that is 
commonly understood as exemplifying deregulation actually extends 
regulation over the conduct of workers even as it withdraws it from the 
conduct of employers.  As a result, individual workers classified as 
independent contractors may be subject to antitrust prosecution for 
organizing for decent wages or working conditions under the price-
fixing doctrine, regardless of the reasonableness of the wage or the 
broader social or economic outcome. 
Assuming for the moment that the labor exemption does not apply to 
a given set of independent contractor workers, and that they are not able 
to prove that they are misclassified employees, the law of price-fixing is 
likely to govern their concerted action.  The modern neoclassical 
interpretation of antitrust, which mostly still reigns, takes market actors 
as black boxes: they are just “firms,” whether they are massive 
corporations or a single truck driver.22 
The relevant cases involving professional workers and “small 
producers,” whose primary business is the selling of their services, are 
the best predictor of how low-wage independent contractor workers 
would be treated by antitrust law (and of how “professional” 
independent contractor workers actually are treated).  For the most part, 
modern courts apply the law of price-fixing to hold that most collective 
economic action by such actors, particularly if it is aimed at affecting 
prices or other elements of the bargain and often even if it is not, is 
illegal price-fixing, unless some specific exception applies.23  Neither 
the reasonableness of the rate nor a net social or economic benefit 
constitute exceptions.24 
 
22. This was not the case in the formative, pre-New Deal period, as described in Part III, infra. 
23. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 423 
(1990) (collective action by independent lawyers constituted price-fixing); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. 
Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (collective action by independent dentists); Nat’l 
Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Spence v. Se. Alaska Pilots’ Ass’n, 
789 F. Supp. 1007, 1010 (D. Alaska 1990) (antitrust analysis involving association representing 
independent contractor pilots). 
24. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 423–24; Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 
U.S. at 695. 
15_PAUL FINAL .DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/2/2016  10:19 AM 
978 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  47 
An especially apt illustration of this theory of liability is the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Federal Trade Commission v. Superior Court Trial 
Lawyers Ass’n,25 both because it is a seminal case with respect to price-
fixing generally, and because, of all the post-exemption antitrust cases 
involving professional workers or small producers, it involves facts that 
very closely resemble classic labor concerted action in which low- or 
mid-wage independent contractors might engage.  In the 1970s and 80s, 
the District of Columbia had contracted the representation of indigent 
defendants in the majority of criminal cases to a panel of private 
attorneys and paid them only $30 per hour for in-court time and $25 per 
hour for out-of-court time.  The Superior Court Trial Lawyers 
Association, whose membership was comprised of these panel 
attorneys, initially tried to persuade the District to raise its members’ 
rates through political delegations and similar efforts.  When those 
efforts were unsuccessful, the attorneys decided they had no choice but 
to take direct action.  They formed a strike committee and agreed to 
stop taking new panel work until the District agreed to their proposed 
rate schedule.  The strike went off with 90% participation, and the 
District acceded to increased rates.26 
The Federal Trade Commission filed a complaint against the 
association, alleging an agreement in restraint of trade by “refusing to 
compete for or accept new appointments under the CJA program[;] . . . 
a conspiracy to fix prices and to conduct a boycott”; and engaging in 
“unfair methods of competition.”27  Rejecting the administrative law 
judge’s conclusion that the agreement among the lawyers had not 
caused economic harm, the FTC decided that the agreement had been a 
“coercive, concerted refusal to deal” and also caused harm (“substantial 
anticompetitive effects”).28  Accordingly, it entered an order prohibiting 
any future boycotts: it ordered the lawyers to desist from engaging in 
any collective withholding of labor in an effort to improve their working 
conditions.  The court of appeal vacated the FTC’s cease-and-desist 
order, holding that the expressive component of the boycott (discussed 
further in Part IV, infra) warranted closer scrutiny, and in particular that 
it required a consideration of whether the association possessed 
 
25. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 423–24. 
26. Id. at 416. 
27. Id. at 418.  Suit was brought under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which 
gives the agency the authority to bring litigation under the Sherman Act.  Id. at 414 (citing 
Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 45 (2012))). 
28. Id. at 419–20. 
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significant market power.29  The Supreme Court endorsed the court of 
appeal’s analysis that the “respondents’ boycott constituted a classic 
restraint of trade within the meaning of Section 1 of the Sherman Act,” 
agreeing that “this constriction of supply is the essence of ‘price-fixing,’ 
whether it be accomplished by agreeing upon a price . . . or by agreeing 
upon an output, which will increase the price offered.”30  It then insisted 
that per se treatment was indeed appropriate, and that neither the 
reasonableness of the price set nor lack of market power on the part of 
small parties can save anticompetitive behavior from sanction.31  Within 
the modern antitrust jurisprudence, Trial Lawyers is the case whose 
facts most closely track the sort of worker collective action with which 
this Article is concerned, and it also represents a certain rigid apex of 
the Court’s neoclassical approach to price-fixing .32 
Following Trial Lawyers and these general principles, a court 
considering labor organizing activity—for example, a strike for higher 
wages on the part of non-employee truck drivers, artists or art workers, 
cab drivers, or even day laborers—may not only deny labor and 
employment law protections to such workers, but may impose treble 
damages or criminal penalties on the workers instead.  Although the 
issue has not been presented to an appellate court (or a trial court 
making a decision of law), Trial Lawyers is a reasonable predictor of 
how it may be decided by a court that chooses to double down on the 
neoclassical approach rather than reconsider it. 
B.  An Object Lesson in the Revival of Antitrust as a Bar to Worker 
Collective Action 
The grassroots movement of port truck drivers in the deregulation 
era, aimed at improving poor pay and working conditions, drew 
significant antitrust scrutiny that in turn shaped that movement.  This 
example illustrates the significant obstacle antitrust poses to workers 
classified as independent contractors who organize to improve their pay 
and working conditions. 
Deregulation-era trucking is characterized by what Michael Belzer 
calls the labor market paradox: perennial shortages of skilled drivers, 
coupled with rock-bottom wages and poor working conditions.33  
 
29. Id. at 420. 
30. Id. at 423. 
31. Id. at 423–24; see also infra Part IV.B.3 (discussing the First Amendment aspects of the 
Court’s analysis). 
32. See infra Part IV.B.3 (discussing the First Amendment implications of antitrust law). 
33. MICHAEL BELZER, SWEATSHOPS ON WHEELS: WINNERS AND LOSERS IN TRUCKING 
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Deregulation economic policy has been the apparent cause.34  Returns 
on equity in trucking, particularly in the truckload market,35 were not 
high to begin with; post-deregulation, one might argue that they are 
actually below cost in the economic sense.36  Employers thus often are 
forced to cut wages below what they would like, and below what they 
know is required to attract or keep skilled drivers.  Drivers in the 
truckload market, which includes port truck drivers, typically earn pay 
in the minimum wage range and work extremely long hours.37 
Port truck drivers in the deregulation era began organizing, both 
among themselves and in coordination with established labor 
organizations, as early as the late 1980s, in response to the extremely 
poor working conditions that ensued from deregulation of the trucking 
industry.  The following decade and a half were marked with numerous 
 
DEREGULATION 151–54 (2000) (defining the labor market paradox). 
34. Belzer’s description of the labor market effects of deregulation policy can be summarized 
by saying that numerous established firms quickly went out of business, that many new (non-
union) firms entered the market, and that intense price competition forced wages lower and lower.  
In the early 1980’s, in the wake of the Motor Carrier Act, around half of the Class I and Class II 
general freight carriers, most of them union, went out of business.  At the same time, many new 
non-union carriers registered with the Department of Transportation.  But these changes did not 
happen evenly across the trucking industry.  The market largely fractured along TL/LTL 
(“truckload” and “less-than-truckload”) lines, which had not been its prior organizing principle.  
Surviving firms in the general freight market—the prior biggest carriers—largely shed their TL 
business, and grew hugely within the LTL sector, taking up the space left by smaller carriers that 
had left the market.  These firms included for example United Parcel Service (“UPS”), which 
remained union and largely mid-wage.  The general freight market consequently concentrated 
five-fold.  Meanwhile, the earlier peripheral TL-only market exploded, seeing the vast majority of 
the new entrants while also seeing competition, particularly price competition, increase sharply.  
Id. at 41–42. 
35. The contrast is to the LTL market (e.g., the UPS and Federal Express (“FedEx”)).  Id. at 
202, 204. 
36. Cf. id. at 202 (suggesting that post-deregulation trucking might be a perfect market in the 
context of orthodox economic theory, in the sense that profits approach zero).  However, it might 
be more accurate to say that profits typically dip below zero when one considers them not in the 
accounting sense (net of revenue and out-of-pocket costs), but in the economic sense (net of 
revenue, out-of-pocket costs, and the opportunity cost of capital).  HYLTON, supra note 13, at 94–
98 (2003).  The latter would explain the transitoriness of many port trucking firms, and the niche 
character of many that have any lasting power at all, enabled by idiosyncratic factors (e.g., special 
deals, sometimes through family connections, with certain shippers; existence of other 
operational arms that subsidize the port trucking operations; personal commitment of individual 
owners or owning families who did well before deregulation).  Id. 
37. As of 2000, average real wages in trucking were back at late 1950’s levels.  BELZER, 
supra note 33, at 38.  But this statistic belies the true decline, for unlike in the late 1950’s, when 
the industry had not yet fractured into TL and LTL sectors and was more centralized, generally 
speaking, the current market is characterized by very high wage differentials between these two 
subsectors.  Id.  TL truck drivers, including port truck drivers, thus earn close to minimum wage, 
if not less.  Drivers as a rule also work extremely long hours, raising serious health and safety 
issues.  Id. at 152. 
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strikes over issues relating to pay and working conditions, including but 
not limited to: the failure to account, in pay rates, for spikes in fuel 
prices; failure to compensate long periods of waiting at port terminals; 
and numerous safety issues.38  The International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters was intermittently involved in driver organizing during this 
period, particularly in Los Angeles and Miami, but most of the 
concerted action was led by independent drivers’ organizations.39 
A number of these actions drew regulatory scrutiny and lawsuits.  
The United Container Movers Association (“UCMA”) was a grassroots, 
independent drivers’ association with some strength, at a minimum, in, 
Baltimore, Charleston, Seattle, and Savannah.  UCMA and its worker 
leadership found itself as the target of a federal investigation by the 
Clinton-era Federal Trade Commission, for price-fixing as a result of 
their organizing toward a union and as a result of work stoppages over 
low pay and long, uncompensated wait times at ports.  The FTC went so 
far as to serve several drivers, who stated that they were working “18 
hours a day for less than the minimum wage just to make the payments 
on our trucks and put food on the table” with subpoenas to testify as to 
their role in a possible price-fixing conspiracy.40  Some time later, the 
Support Trucking Group, another independent drivers’ association 
based in Miami, engaged in concerted action over low wages, 
equipment safety issues, and wait time.  It, together with numerous 
individual truck drivers, was hit with lawsuits from multiple entities, 
including port terminal operators and Miami-Dade County itself.41 
 
38. Interview with Jon Zerolnick, Research Dir., L.A. All. for a New Econ. (Aug. 22, 2014) 
(interview notes on file with the author); Interview with Jon Zerolnick, Research Dir., L.A. All. 
for a New Econ. (August 3, 2015) (interview notes on file with the author); see RUTH MILLIKEN, 
L.A. STORY: IMMIGRANT WORKERS AND THE FUTURE OF THE U.S. LABOR MOVEMENT 178–84 
(2006) (describing the grassroots, self-starting character of port truck driver organizing in the 
1980’s and 1990’s). 
39. MILLIKEN, supra note 38, 178–84; Interview with John Canham-Clyne, Former Dir., Ports 
Campaign, Change to Win (May 28, 2014) (interview notes on file with the author); Interview 
with Michael Manley, Staff Attorney, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters (January 8, 2015) (interview notes 
on file with the author). 
40. Bill Mongelluzzo, Operators Seek to Organize, J. OF COM. (Dec. 1, 1999, 7:00 PM), 
http://www.joc.com/operators-seek-organize_19991201.html; see also Rip Watson, Container 
Haulers Seek to Unionize, J. OF COM. (Sept. 12, 1999, 8:00 PM), http://www.joc.com/container-
haulers-seek-unionize_19990912.html; Mark Gordon, Truckers Union Boss Ordered to Testify , 
FLA. TIMES UNION (Dec. 4, 1999), http://jacksonville.com/tu-online/stories/120499/bus_1E1FTC 
__.html. 
41. Complaint for Antitrust Violations at 1–2, Miami-Dade Cty. v. Support Trucking Grp., 
No. 04-cv-21687, 2004 WL 2868811 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (“This case arises out of a massive 
conspiracy . . . with the purpose and effect of an attempt to monopolize, to fix prices and to 
commit other unlawful practices designed to inflate the prices of trucking services provided by 
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These actions, while they did not go to verdict or result in decisions 
of law,42 profoundly shaped the course of organizing in this industry.  
The constantly looming specter of antitrust liability powerfully 
structured the strategy that port truck drivers pursued in their attempt to 
improve their working conditions and to gain a collective voice in the 
workplace—particularly once the drivers’ efforts were coordinated into 
a comprehensive national campaign.43  The founding director of that 
campaign observed: “[The threat of antitrust liability] was one of the 
three or four major strategic factors in virtually everything that we did.  
It was part of our checklist.  The specter of antitrust liability has 
significantly suppressed drivers’ ability to take collective action to 
change their economic circumstances.”44  The counsel to the campaign 
noted that the campaign was extremely cautious about worker collective 
action on antitrust grounds in its early years, observing: “Apart from the 
merits and whether damages were recovered, the sheer cost of 
defending such an action would have been sufficient to shut the 
campaign down.”45 
More recently, when an independent group of port truck drivers in 
Oakland, California engaged in an episode of collective action 
(regarding pay rates, surcharges, and uncompensated wait time), their 
attorney expressed his view that had the movement gained power, they 
would be likely to face antitrust scrutiny.46  One driver spoke of the 
drivers’ aspiration to workers’ association regardless of employee 
status,47 which antitrust might view as an illegal cartel.  
 
non-union truckers for the movement of goods into and out of the Port of Miami.”); Port of 
Miami Terminal Operating Co. v. Support Trucking, No. 04-cv-21703, 2004 WL 2868838 (S.D. 
Fla. 2004); Antillean Marine Shipping Corp. v. Various Indep. Owners & Operators of Indep. 
Trucking Cos., No. 04-cv-22530, 2004 WL 2875072 (S.D. Fla 2004); Universal Maritime Serv. 
Corp. v. Support Trucking Grp., Nos. 04-cv-21687, 04-cv-21688, and 04-cv-21703, 2004 WL 
2868849 (S.D. Fla. 2004). 
42. While it is generally quite difficult to positively determine whether a settlement was 
reached from docket records alone, a reasonable inference is that the prospect of defending such a 
lawsuit, which individual low-income or middle-income defendants are not in a position to do, 
prompted the result desired by plaintiffs in many of these cases: an end to the collective action, 
and economic capitulation to the plaintiffs’ terms. 
43. These efforts were largely consolidated into a nationally organized campaign when 
Change to Win, a coalition of organizing-oriented labor unions, launched its port trucking 
campaign in 2006.  Interview with John Canham-Clyne, supra note 39. 
44. Id. 
45. Interview with Michael Manley, supra note 39. 
46. Interview with Dan Siegel, Partner, Siegel & Yee (December 23, 2013) (interview notes 
on file with the author). 
47. Interview with Frank Adams, Port Truck Driver & Former Comm. Member, Port of 
Oakland Truckers Ass’n (December 23, 2013) (interview notes on file with the author). 
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Similarly, the threat of antitrust liability may be a formidable barrier 
to concerted worker action to improve or change working conditions in 
other industries with large concentrations of independent contractor 
workers, including other sectors of the trucking industry.  Some such 
industries that have seen active organizing include taxi drivers,48 and 
home health care and child care providers.49  In both cases, there have 
been hints of the antitrust law apparatus being deployed against worker 
organizing, or hints that could it be so deployed.  In the case of home 
health care worker organizing, the FTC has in the past expressly taken a 
position against a collective bargaining scheme for such workers, noting 
that it would “require that private parties engage in conduct that 
normally would be deemed per se violations of federal antitrust law, 
including price fixing between competitors.”50  The threat can also be 
glimpsed in lawsuits initiated in reaction to grassroots collective action 
by workers outside formal organizing campaigns.  A comprehensive 
search of antitrust actions filed between 2000 and 2014 revealed 
additional instances of actual litigation targeting collective action by 
workers outside formal organizing campaigns, including grassroots 
actions by low-paid truck drivers in other sub-sectors that were met with 
antitrust prosecution.51  Anecdotal evidence—and a reasonable 
 
48. Veena Dubal, Wage Slave or Entrepreneur?: Contesting the Dualism of Legal Worker 
Identities (2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Loyola University Chicago School of 
Law Journal); see also BIJU MATHEW, TAXI!  CABS AND CAPITALISM IN NEW YORK CITY 
(2008). 
49. See Peggie R. Smith, The Publicization of Home-Based Care Work in State Labor Law, 92 
MINN. L. REV. 1390, 1391 (2008) (noting the prevalence of the independent contractor form in 
home health care work and describing active organizing among such workers); Peggie R. Smith, 
Welfare, Child Care, and the People Who Care: Union Representation of Family Child Care 
Providers, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 321, 359 (2006) (noting that the recent successful organizing 
efforts among such workers have been premised on the state action exemption to antitrust law, 
where the state assumes the role of employer-of-record).  The state action exemption, of course, 
requires the political cooperation of a state entity together with an industry whose structure would 
allow for such an approach. 
50. FTC Staff Comment to the Hon. William J. Seitz Concerning Ohio Exec. Order No. 2007-
23S to Establish Collective Bargaining for Home Health Care Workers (Feb. 14, 2008).  This is 
in line with the FTC’s general orientation toward health care providers, including doctors.  In the 
case of taxi drivers, while the FTC has not addressed worker organizing directly, it has taken an 
active interest in the taxi industry generally that, given the agency’s general operating principles, 
may have implications for worker organizing and in particular for any cooperative scheme that 
resembles collective bargaining. 
51. At a minimum, the actions involving workers pursuing concerted action, excluding 
lawsuits against port truck drivers and driver associations, include: Complaint at 1–2, Siboney 
Contracting Co. v. Owners Ass’n of Palm Beach & Broward Cty., No. 9:00-cv-08149-ASG (S.D. 
Fla. 2000) (indicating that the plaintiff was a corporation that “act[ed] as a broker of rock and 
aggregate materials for a variety of road and building projects, and . . . the [i]ndividual 
[d]efendants are independent truck owner-operators who are members of the Association and 
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inference based on the available evidence—suggests that there have 
been additional threats to sue drawn by such scattered worker actions, 
beyond what can be found in official court records.  The seriousness of 
the threat is intensified in cases of nontraditional organizing, because 
some exceptions likely protect workers who are also seeking employee 
status or who are organizing in concert with an established labor 
organization that already has a sectoral presence representing 
employees.52 
C.  Universe of Potential Defendants  
Although difficult to measure with precision, independent contractor 
workers have been estimated at somewhere between 6–7% of the 
overall work force.53  The generally accepted view is that this 
proportion is increasing.54  Independent contractors are spread widely in 
the type of work they perform, the amounts they earn, and their 
educational and class backgrounds.  There are independent contractors 
in almost every trade, including the professional trades, and also in 
almost every type of manufacturing industry that allows for piecework.  
For purposes of this Section, I refer to workers as independent 
contractors when their employers classify them as such—putting aside 
the question, for the moment, whether this would be the accurate legal 
classification if tested. 
We may view the workers we have in mind as comprising three 
shades on a spectrum with imprecise and permeable borders.  First, 
 
believed to be leaders of the Association” and alleged a coordinated work stoppage aimed at a 
15% pay rate increase due to a spike in fuel prices); Verified Complaint at 3, 10, Horizon Lines of 
P.R., Inc. v. Asociacion de Camioneros de Arrastre de P.R., Inc., No. 3:05-cv-01801-PG (D.P.R. 
2005) (alleging that an independent drivers’ association conducted a classic work stoppage to 
increase rates); Verified Complaint at 1, 3, HN1 Therapy Network of P.R., LLC v. Asociacion 
Puertoriquena de Fisioterapia, Inc., No. 03:10-cv-1404 (D.P.R. 2010) (identifying a classic group 
boycott by physical therapists); Verified Complaint at 12, Humana Health Plans of P.R., Inc. v. 
Juan L. Vilaro, No. 3:12-cv-1445 (D.P.R. 2012) (claiming concerted price-fixing and boycotting 
by physicians).  Numerous instances of lawsuits against small producers who may also be 
considered workers are excluded from this list. 
52. See infra Part II.C.2.b (describing legal arguments that may protect some organizing 
among independent contractor workers from antitrust scrutiny). 
53. Peter H. Cappelli & J.R. Keller, A Study of the Extent and Potential Causes of Alternative 
Employment Arrangements, 66 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 874, 890 (2013). 
54. Noah D. Zatz, Working Beyond the Reach or Grasp of Employment Law, in THE GLOVES-
OFF ECONOMY: WORKPLACE STANDARDS AT THE BOTTOM OF AMERICA’S LABOR MARKET 31, 
35–36 (Annette Bernhardt et al. eds., 2008); see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-
168R, CONTINGENT WORKFORCE 7 (2015) (noting that despite the difficulties in ascertaining a 
clear definition of contingent workers, data suggests that there are millions of contingent workers 
in the market). 
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there are people who many in ordinary parlance might not even call 
“workers,” but whom I choose to include in this spectrum because their 
income derives primarily from their personal labor, that is, from 
services that they personally perform, rather than from other people’s 
labor or from capital investment.  Included within this shade of the 
spectrum are independent doctors, lawyers, engineers, dentists, and 
other professionals, who are not employed by someone else and who 
either have their own small storefront or are self-employed on paper but 
work in, and for, larger facilities.  These people typically have some 
kind of professional degree or certification, earn middle to high 
incomes, and are members of the professional social class.  While they 
may employ an administrative or support employee, they personally 
provide the core services performed by their enterprise.55 
A second set of workers who are often classified as independent 
contractors, we might dub “soft professionals”—they generally do not 
have a formal professional degree and may or may not identify with and 
be considered part of the professional social class, but they have 
considerable expertise in a relatively specialized field of work, are not 
as easily individually replaceable as low-wage workers, and generally 
earn middle incomes.  This set of workers may labor in informational 
technology; in the entertainment industry, particularly pre- and post-
production; repair and construction (electricians and plumbers); and the 
beauty, massage, and personal care industries. 
A third sizable set of workers classified as independent contractors 
have relatively little formal education (or are unable to take advantage 
of it in the labor market, due to migration across national borders or 
other factors), may be considered and consider themselves working 
class, are relatively easily replaceable by employers on an individual 
level, and earn low wages.  Many people in this category work as truck 
drivers, taxi drivers or drivers for app-based ride-providing services, 
laborers in building construction, in home healthcare, and as casual or 
day laborers.56   
 
55. This category of workers may receive softer antitrust scrutiny.  See infra Part IV.B.2.  
Under this scheme, a lawyer or doctor who is no one’s employee could obviously be classified as 
primarily a worker or primarily a business owner, and the classification would depend upon the 
number of production (as opposed to administrative) employees she has, and the proportion of the 
time she spends on (and the income she derives from) core services personally performed by her 
(engaging in lawyering or doctoring work), versus her ownership over and management of others’ 
income-earning labor (overseeing associates’ work, investing assets, etc.).  Nothing in the 
argument of this Article relies upon precisely demarcating that line, although the general factors 
that would determine its location are useful to have in mind. 
56. Plainly, there is overlap at each of these borders.  For example, many laboring in the 
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Finally, small commodity producers who rely in large part on 
personal labor and lack market power should also be provisionally 
included in the universe. Of especial historical importance are small 
farmers, whose livelihoods were greatly affected by the concentrations 
of economic power that antitrust originally sought to address and who 
participated in historic alliances with labor organizations to address 
their economic conditions.57  
Any type of collective action aimed at improving pay rates or 
working conditions might expose the groups of workers and economic 
actors just described58 to antitrust liability.  This rule, I aim to show in 
the balance of this Article, is a powerful bludgeon with shaky 
foundations. 
D.  Intersection with Work Law  
It is well known that in the contemporary landscape of labor and 
employment law, the question “who is an employee?” is an increasingly 
dominant one, given the growth of “contingent labor” in the workforce 
and the economy.  Contingent labor encompasses the various 
mechanisms by which the traditional employment relationship, which is 
to a great extent presupposed by extant work law, is attenuated by the 
employer of labor: subcontracting, temporary work arrangements, and 
retaining workers as “independent contractors” rather than employees.  
Each of these arrangements abridges the reach of work law, but none so 
completely as the independent contractor arrangement, which purports 
to nullify the employment relation altogether.59 
Workers and worker advocates have thus sought to re-establish the 
reach of extant work law through the use of legal doctrines and 
strategies whose contention is that although the new work arrangement 
may not look like the traditional employment relationship in some 
superficial respects, it is functionally equivalent to employment. 
Misclassification refers to the contention that despite the nomenclature 
adopted by the employer, a particular work arrangement meets the legal 
test for the employer-employee relationship already contained in the 
 
beauty and personal care industries are low-wage workers, and may earn less than many 
independent contractor truck drivers. 
57. See infra Part II.B (discussing origins of antitrust). 
58. While this Article often focuses primarily on low-wage workers, many of its conclusions 
are generalizable to the other groups of workers and economic actors as well.  In future work, I 
will more directly address the various considerations that might apply to regulating collective 
action among the groups. 
59. Zatz, supra note 54, at 34–36, 44–45. 
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law.  The central, but not only, factors in this determination relate to the 
level of control that the putative employer exerts over the work 
performed and the operations of which the work is a part.60  Another set 
of factors applicable under many of the tests for employment status 
takes into account the “economic realities” of the work relationship, 
which are mainly indicia of the relative power of the two parties to set 
the terms and conditions of the work performed.61  Because 
employment status is the threshold question for various regulatory 
schemes, a variety of definitions and tests apply, and a worker might in 
theory be considered an employee for purposes of a certain statute and a 
contractor for another.62 
The misclassification strategy, however, is not sufficient to dispose of 
the “independent contractor question.”  There are practical, factual, and 
doctrinal reasons for this.  As an initial matter, there are the extremely 
significant practical limitations that attend regulatory enforcement as 
well as private litigation in terms of both resources and delay, which 
constrain workers’ ability to establish employee status even where it is 
almost certainly the proper legal conclusion.63  Beyond this, employers 
possess a great deal of power to unilaterally dictate the very factual 
conditions that determine whether the worker is legally an employee.  
Indeed, a typical response to misclassification litigation is for employers 
to adjust operations and the conditions of work so that employee status 
is again thrown into question and so that they may continue to classify 
workers as independent contractors under color of law.  This point has 
been made generally by Noah Zatz;64 by Julia Tomassetti in the specific 
context of the FedEx litigation, one of the most significant episodes of 
 
60. Id. at 35. 
61. Id. 
62. Id.; see also Marc Linder, Dependent and Independent Contractors in Recent U.S. Labor 
Law: An Ambiguous Dichotomy Rooted in Simulated Statutory Purposelessness, 21 COMP. LAB. 
L. & POLICY J. 187, 187 (1999) (noting that the application of hundreds of statutes and 
regulations hinge on employee status). 
63. See generally Scott Cummings, Preemptive Strike: Law in the Campaign for Clean 
Trucks, 4 UC IRVINE L.R. 939, 1130–40 (describing how these obstacles have manifested in a 
concrete instance, in the port trucking industry).  As Cummings notes, “[t]he path was not easy.  
In an industry of hundreds of small companies, misclassification litigation was necessarily a 
piecemeal approach”; the strategy was dependent upon private firms willing to take a financial 
risk on fees, and even a successful case would not compel reclassification.  Id. at 1131–32.  For 
this and other reasons, misclassification litigation was the campaign’s “Plan C.”  Id. at 1134. 
64. See Noah D. Zatz, Beyond Misclassification: Tackling the Independent Contractor 
Problem Without Redefining Employment, 26 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 279, 288–89 (2011) 
(critiquing the “static view” of misclassification, which ignores both employers’ fundamental 
control over the facts that determine employee status and the role of law in employers’ choices). 
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misclassification litigation in the United States;65 and by Scott 
Cummings in the context of the port truck drivers’ movement.66 
Moreover, employer response aside, many low-wage workers may 
not meet the legal test for employee status even under current 
conditions.  This may turn out to be true in segment of the “gig 
economy,” as Uber, Lyft, and other app-based labor brokering services 
are sometimes called; even courts are beginning to comment on the 
potential limitations of the existing legal framework for determining 
workers’ status under changing conditions.67  These facts are also 
acknowledged in the academic literature as forming the basis for 
various proposals that would go beyond the traditional employee and 
independent contractor distinction.68  Finally, many non-employee 
workers have chosen not to contest their independent contractor status 
despite engaging in organizing activity.  Notable examples are groups of 
taxi drivers69 and of artists and art handlers.70  In either case, we are 
 
65. Julia Tomassetti, From Hierarchies to Markets: FedEx Drivers and the Work Contract as 
Institutional Marker, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L.R. (forthcoming 2016). 
66. Cummings, supra note 63, at 1132 (noting that in the context of the port trucking 
campaign, “[e]ven successful cases . . . often had the effect of simply making companies more 
stringent about following the independent-contractor rules”).  Cummings further states that  
“industry lawyers conducted trainings . . . [o]ne such update recommended that companies ‘DO 
NOT Use a Driver Handbook that looks like an employee manual,’ or require a driver to ‘wear a 
company logo,’ ‘paint the truck a particular color,’ or ‘display a company ID card’”).  Id. at 1138. 
67. Judge Chen, in denying Uber’s motion for summary judgment in the currently pending, 
high-profile wage and hour class action brought by its drivers, stated explicitly: 
The application of the traditional test of employment—a test which evolved under an 
economic model very different from the new “sharing economy”—to Uber’s business 
model creates significant challenges. . . . It may be that the legislature or appellate 
courts may eventually refine or revise [the Borello] test in the context of the new 
economy.  It is conceivable that the legislature would enact rules particular to the new 
so-called “sharing economy.” 
O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1153 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
68. These include proposals to regulate “dependent contractors” or to divorce many of the 
benefits traditionally associated with employment from that status and to make them available on 
some other basis instead.  Linder, supra note 62; see also Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still 
Can’t Tell an Employee When it Sees One and Why it Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 301 (2001) (proposing “an approach to statutory coverage based on the 
character of the transactions between the parties instead of the status of the parties”). 
69. Dubal, supra note 48, at 50–56 (regarding San Francisco taxi workers); Interview with 
Aaron Chappell, Campaign Manager, Org. Dep’t, AFL-CIO (July 17, 2015) (regarding drivers 
organized with the National Taxi Workers Alliance) (interview notes on file with the author). 
70. See, e.g., WORKING ARTISTS & GREATER ECON. (W.A.G.E.), http://www.wageforwork. 
com (last visited Mar. 22, 2016) (noting the fair-pay certification scheme of W.A.G.E); ART 
HANDLERS ALL. N.Y., http://www.arthandlersalliance.org/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2016) (noting 
the organizing efforts of the Art Handlers Alliance of New York); see also Interview with Steve 
Sewell, Art Handlers All. of N.Y. (Oct. 26, 2015) (interview notes on file with the author). 
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talking about workers who sell their personal labor, earn relatively low 
pay for that labor, and are price-takers in the market.71 
Part I.B, supra, discussed antitrust liability for unilateral worker 
collective action.  In addition, any regulatory scheme that aims to 
address collective action by such workers in anything but a purely 
punitive manner, or aims to provide for minimum working standards, 
will also come up against the outer limits imposed by antitrust.  As the 
organizing efforts of freelancers, independent contractors, and gig 
economy workers continue to gain momentum, we can expect to see 
such proposed schemes.  Members of the New York City Council have 
recently stated that they are currently developing this type of regulatory 
scheme, prompted by the efforts of the Freelancers Union and other 
organizing groups.72  The City of Seattle recently enacted an ordinance 
granting collective bargaining rights to drivers for taxicab, limo, and 
“transportation network companies” (encompassing Uber, Lyft and 
other companies in the on-demand sector) who are classified as 
independent contractors rather than employees.73  Local regulation, as 
such schemes are likely to be, will probably face federal preemption 
lawsuits not only under the “NLRA,”74 but also under antitrust.75 
A corollary of the main point of this Article is thus that “fixing” 
misclassification will not obviate the problem of non-employee workers 
and antitrust liability, a problem that is likely to become more pressing 
as freelance work becomes increasingly prevalent.  To hope that 
tinkering at the surface with the current legal classifications of workers 
can, alone, suffice to solve the problem I am posing, is to ignore the 
fundamental ways in which the underlying structure of antitrust law’s 
 
71. There are many reasons, explored in the balance of this Article, not to expose such 
workers to antitrust liability for collective action; for the present purpose, I wish to establish 
simply that “misclassification” does not, as a factual matter, obviate the issue. 
72. Samar Khurshid, City Council Developing New Protections for Workers in ‘Gig’ 
Economy, GOTHAM GAZETTE (Nov. 5, 2015), http://www.gothamgazette.com/index.php/ 
government/5971-city-council-developing-new-protections-for-workers-in-gig-economy. 
73. SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE §§ 630.310.110, 6.310.735 (2016), http://clerk.seattle.gov/~ 
legislativeItems/Ordinances/Ord_124968.pdf 
74. It is worth noting that any preemption suit under the NLRA—which would have to rely 
upon the contention that the NLRA embodies the congressional judgment to deny organizing 
rights to non-employees, at least for the most part—would ultimately be parasitic, if not by direct 
doctrinal path then by conceptual reliance, upon the outer limits set by antitrust, as well.  This 
point should become clearer after considering the argument of Part II, infra, and will also be 
developed further in future work. 
75. Indeed, as this Article was going to print, an industry group (the United States Chamber of 
Commerce, no less) filed a lawsuit challenging the Seattle ordinance on grounds that it is barred 
by antitrust law and by the NLRA.  The complaint leads with the antitrust challenge.  Complaint, 
Chamber of Commerce v. City of Seattle, No. 2:16-cv-00322 (W.D. Wash., Mar. 3, 2016). 
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relationship to labor shapes the current categories in the first place.  To 
be sure, a consideration of that deep relationship ought to lead us 
eventually to a reconsideration of the current categories.  But to start by 
adjusting the boundaries between “employee” and “non-employee”—
with the idea that this will obviate the need to consider that deeper 
relationship—will likely only repeat the mistake that led us to the 
current situation (Part III, infra).  That deeper relationship between 
antitrust and workers informs everything from the legal consequences of 
the current categories, to their definitions and borders, to the existential 
struggles faced by workers who are left out in the cold by them.  To 
understand it, we must perform some conceptual excavation. 
II.  OF MARKETS, COMBINATIONS, AND SERVANTS: HOW ANTITRUST LAW 
CAME TO PUNISH WORKER COLLECTIVE ACTION 
The first federal antitrust statute, the Sherman Act, was not originally 
intended to apply to worker collective action, and was instead aimed at 
protecting traditional small American enterprise from the massive 
business conglomerations that arose over the course of the nineteenth 
century.  Gilded Age courts, however, applied the statute to workers’ 
collective action.  Their reasoning merits scrutiny as we analyze a 
policy that has not only shaped American labor history, but also has 
contemporary reverberations that are likely to only become louder. 
Classicism, which dominated the common law at the time of the 
Act’s passage, emphasized freedom of contract and free agency on the 
part of market actors, in reaction to the social and regulatory 
containment of markets that had characterized the prior era.  But the 
classicist project, as to antitrust and workers, was specifically designed 
to invite regulation of workers’ freely chosen actions and contracts, not 
to deflect it. 
Understood as a component of the larger endeavor by the courts to 
construct a national market, courts’ application of the Sherman Act to 
worker collective action displayed their willingness to subordinate 
workers’ freedom of action, both political and economic, to that project, 
which was represented by the notion of “free flow of trade” in the cases.  
That phrase was often used interchangeably with “freedom of contract,” 
not only in the cases applying the Sherman Act to labor, but also in 
other areas of law that likewise comprised the project of constructing 
the national market.  Yet the distinction between the two concepts is 
made evident in the Sherman Act labor cases, because the application of 
the Act could not be justified on freedom of contract grounds, and 
instead required the justification involving the “free flow of trade.” 
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While classicists argued that the Sherman Act ought to be extended 
to workers on grounds of parity—because business was already subject 
to it—the fact is that the will of business owners was never made to 
bend to the “free flow of trade” in the way that the will of workers was. 
An act and an omission together accomplished this: the judge-made 
“corporate exemption,” an analogue of which workers never enjoyed, 
and the relative lack of enforcement of Section 2 of the Act (regulating 
mergers). 
A.  Classicist Trade Regulation and Nineteenth-Century Labor 
Regulation 
The Sherman Act regulates trade and, contentiously, labor.76  The 
statute itself says nothing explicitly about labor or work, is very general 
in its pronouncements, and invokes concepts (“restraint of trade”) that 
were in flux and transition at the time of its drafting.  The forms of trade 
and labor regulation extant at the time of the passage of the Act are 
therefore of some relevance in understanding its meaning. 
The defining element of classicist trade regulation77 of the Gilded 
Age period was its opposition to the sort of economic regulation that 
had preceded it.  Commercial law and trade regulation once looked very 
different, often functioning to contain markets (rather than police 
barriers to them).78  Moreover, commercial and trade regulation largely 
existed in a mutually reinforcing relation with the collective action of 
producers (rather than prohibiting it).79  Indeed, the original ancestors of 
antitrust law date to a time before markets defined economic life: 
doctrines such as forestalling (prohibiting the buying up of merchandise 
before it reached the market; for example, buying up crops still in the 
 
76. It regulated labor directly from shortly after its passage until the New Deal.  It continued 
to regulate labor indirectly throughout the New Deal period, and is likely to exert increasing 
direct and indirect effects on workers in our current era. 
77. My use of the term “classicism” is drawn from the work of antitrust scholar Herbert 
Hovenkamp.  However, my use of the term herein is somewhat broader and less historically 
specific: I mean to include the overall approach to economic regulation that had freedom of 
contract and free trade as its governing ideals, which means I may characterize some decisions 
and commentary as classicist when Hovenkamp would not do so. 
78. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Sherman Act and the Classical Theory of Competition, 74 IOWA 
L. REV. 1019, 1021 (1989); see also HYLTON, supra note 13, at 32 (noting that while today courts 
aim to enhance competition, “early market interference statutes served largely to suppress 
competition”). 
79. Gary Richardson, A Tale of Two Theories: Monopolies and Craft Guilds in Medieval 
England and Modern Imagination, 23 J. HIST. ECON. THOUGHT 217, 233 (2001) (showing that in 
some cases the edicts of economic collectives such as guilds were actually continuous with, and 
even evolved into, local trade regulation). 
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field), engrossing (prohibiting the stockpiling of merchandise in order 
to raise prices), and regrating (prohibiting the buying and reselling of 
merchandise in the same or neighboring markets after prices rise).80  
Modern commentators, steeped in neoclassicism, may have a tendency 
to see these doctrines as motivated by an anti-competitive policy.81  But 
these policies likely had both anti-competitive and pro-competitive 
effects.  A better description might be that they were motivated by 
something other than the contemporary idea of competition altogether—
which did not, after all, exist yet.  They simply defined and regulated 
trade and markets in the interest of social welfare, and that conception 
of welfare was not particularly tied to the idea of market competition.82 
Meanwhile, although the hierarchical and coercive character of labor 
regulation inherited from the feudal era was a constant both prior to and 
during the Gilded Age, it is likely that at least in the United States, 
many more working people came under its purview during the Gilded 
Age.83  In other words, prior to the transformation in which the national 
market came to define economic life84 and the modern business 
corporation replaced its almost unrecognizable pre-market ancestor,85 
many working people labored outside the context of wage labor, and 
thus outside master and servant law.  Many working people thus 
 
80. HYLTON, supra note 13, at 32; Richardson, supra note 79, at 218. 
81. “The main difference between these early statutes and the Sherman Act is that courts 
interpret federal antitrust law today as aiming to enhance competition, while the early market 
interference statutes served largely to suppress competition.”  HYLTON, supra note 13, at 32. 
82. See Richardson, supra note 79, at 230 (recognizing that “trading regulations” functioned 
to help ensure that economic activity was “in the general interest”); KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT 
TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 45–58 (2001) 
(arguing that all economic regulation prior to the emergence of market economies was embedded 
in that particular society’s conception of the overall social good, rather than existing in a separate 
economic sphere in which market competition was the reigning ideal). 
83. See infra Part II.A.2. 
84. See generally RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AMERICAN 
INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1877–1900 (2000) (describing the political construction of the national 
market). 
85. Their ancestor, the guild, combined the activities of both commerce and labor.  As a legal 
category, very early corporations were thus simply one species of the cooperative organizations 
that economist Gary Richardson calls “occupational cooperatives.”  Gary Richardson & Michael 
McBride, Religion, Longevity, and Cooperation: The Case of the Craft Guild, 71 J. ECON. 
BEHAV. & ORG. 172, 174 (2009).  In the United States, “[p]rior to the 1840s, the character and 
organization of American business enterprise was predominantly small-scale,” with “relatively 
low levels of capitalization.”  CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR 
RELATIONS, LAW, AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880–1960, at 17 
(1985); see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836–1937, at 13 
(1991) (describing the pre-classical American business corporation). 
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enjoyed a greater level of both legal and economic independence than 
what became normal in the Gilded Age.86 
As we shall see, these two streams, classicist trade regulation and 
feudal labor regulation, converged in the application of the Sherman Act 
to worker collective action.  Meanwhile, the surviving minor strain of 
republicanism, which had animated the Act in the first place, carried 
forward echoes of the economic regulation that had preceded both the 
trade and labor regimes of the Gilded Age. 
1.  Classicist Trade Regulation 
According to the conventional view, the Sherman Act was 
continuous with the common law of trade regulation.  That body of law 
was primarily concerned removing the vestiges of pre-market trade 
regulation to the extent that they placed constraints on the activities of 
market actors.87  Whether the official ideology of freedom of contract 
and trade, and individual liberty emphasized in the common law,88 was 
the source or the mechanism of that economic policy, it was certainly 
closely bound up with it.  At the same time, I contend that the classicist 
notion of freedom of trade contained a basic equivocation, between the 
clear liberty-based concept and a more nebulous concept often denoted 
by the phrase the “free flow of trade.”  This notion of “free trade” had 
nothing to do with any person’s freedom, but with the unobstructed free 
flow of commerce.  .  This second conception comes into full relief in 
the cases that apply the Sherman Act to labor,89 where it actually trumps 
the freedom of contract interests that would seem to militate in favor of 
permitting the coordinated actions at issue. 
In terms of distinguishing the official ideology of the classicists from 
that of contemporary “neoclassicists,” Herbert Hovenkamp points out 
that the primary concern of classicism was not competition in the 
contemporary sense, but rather individual liberty for commercial 
actors—in particular, freedom of contract.90  Classicism’s conception of 
competition was derivative of the basic idea of liberty from constraints.  
“For [American classicists] as well as the English classicists, 
 
86. Christopher Tomlins, Subordination, Authority, Law: Subjects in Labor History, 47 INT’L 
LAB. & WORKING-CLASS HIST. 59, 62–63 (1995) (stating that in its pre-market forms, the work 
relationship was not “a single form of relationship but . . . multiple forms of relationship, some of 
sanctioned abuse and abasement (those old disciplines), some of temporary and shifting 
attachment, some of autonomy and self-direction” (emphasis added)). 
87. Hovenkamp, supra note 78, at 1026. 
88. Id. at 1021. 
89. See infra Part II.B.2. 
90. Hovenkamp, supra note 78, at 1021. 
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competition meant both rivalry and freedom from constraints, such as 
the exclusive privileges so common in the Mercantilist period.”91  For 
them, and even well into the transition to neoclassicism, “competition 
referred to a theory about liberty and free choice, not to a description of 
price/cost relationships.”92 
Price-fixing—the paradigmatic modern anticompetitive activity—
was not tortious under the classical common law, much less criminal.93  
One can see why the common law was at best ambivalent: if freely 
entered, such a contract does not violate individual liberty.  “Cartels did 
not jolt the common lawyer’s conscience because no one’s freedom was 
being denied.”94  Further, classicism’s particular conception of 
competition, which included competition between actors in adjacent 
markets (i.e., vertical competition),95 made price-fixing more 
understandable as rational and permissible, self-interested market 
activity by one market actor (the seller) in competition with another (the 
buyer), to which the other was free to respond. 
Similarly, restraints of trade that prevented entry into a market—
restraints that the classical common law viewed as the primary enemy 
of “free trade”—were problematic not because they hurt the consumer 
or distorted the market by decreasing the “natural” number of 
participants in a particular market, but because they violated the 
individual economic liberty of the prospective entrant.  “The historical 
concern of the common law of contracts in restraint of trade was 
coercion, or the elimination of noncontracting parties’ freedom to 
act.”96  For this reason, the common law was “obsess[ed] with 
consideration in cases challenging agreements in restraints of trade,” 
such as non-compete clauses.97   
In short, classicist principles generally favored commercial actors’ 
freedom to compete, including the freedom to vertically compete—for 
sellers to compete with buyers, for example.  Nevertheless, as we shall 
see, classicists affirmatively sought, through the mechanism of the 
Sherman Act, to curb workers’ freedom to vertically compete, that is, to 
curb their freedom to compete with capital by acting collectively to 
withhold labor upon condition of better wages or working conditions.  
 
91. Id. at 1025 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 1026–29. 
94. Id. at 1027. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 1026. 
97. Id. at 1027. 
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To understand this, we require the related but distinct concept of the 
“free flow of trade,” easily mistaken for a synonym of “freedom of 
trade.”  The concept itself came into full relief in the Sherman Act labor 
cases, for that is where it operated independently of freedom of contract. 
2.  Labor Regulation in the Gilded Age  
The Sherman Act became the first federal statute regulating labor.  
The character of the pre-existing regulation of work is relevant to 
understanding how the Sherman Act came to have that role.  
In the late nineteenth century, the employment relation remained 
within the province of the common-law courts, as the relation between 
masters and servants had been for hundreds of years, while most other 
realms of social life were by then the subject of modern statutes created 
by democratically elected legislators.98  This meant not only that the 
new democratic apparatus of lawmaking was mostly kept apart from the 
workplace, but also that relatively more conservative judges, rather than 
relatively more progressive legislators, were the lawmakers in this 
province.99  The legal constitution of the employment relation at this 
time was the great exception to classicism’s clarion call of economic 
freedom; it carried over the hierarchy, with its concomitant restraints on 
individual freedoms, that had been the defining element of feudal 
society.100  At the same time, with the ascendancy of wage labor, many 
more people and many more economic relationships were brought under 
its purview.101 
 
98. See generally KAREN ORREN, BELATED FEUDALISM: LABOR, THE LAW, AND LIBERAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 79–91 (1991) (discussing the judicial governance of 
master and servant); see also id. at 81 (“[J]udges by their ritual enforcement held up a structure of 
domination that had existed since time out of mind.”); see also FORBATH, supra note 20, at 6 
(“Nowhere else among industrial nations did the judiciary hold such sway over labor relations as 
in nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century America.”). 
99. See ORREN, supra note 98, at 15–16 (“[T]he substance of relations between employers and 
employees still was under the ultimate jurisdiction of courts, as was the case in the Middle Ages, 
and . . . the old common-law rules of labor governance had been left standing while other 
institutions had been changed or dissolved.”). 
100. Id. at 67 (explaining that while commercial interests came unfettered from earlier 
constraints, labor remained subject to them: indeed, “commercial interests . . . were prospering on 
the basis of the ancient labor regime still in place” and “workers continued to be governed by 
quite different precepts, likewise endorsed as beneficial to what one judge” called the “province 
of workingmen”); see also id. at 71–79 (“The order of labor”). 
101. Tomlins, supra note 86, at 63 (“The eventual reduction of these multiple forms [of the 
working relationship] to a single form was in good part shaped by the deployment in English and 
American law of generic rules implementing uniform relations of subjection (master/servant) to 
pertain between those worked and those for whom they worked.”). 
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Karen Orren shows that the employment relation in nineteenth-
century America was suffused with substantive rights and obligations 
that were assigned in part based upon status (as they had been for all 
sectors of feudal society), and not just based upon the content of freely 
bargained contracts.102  Many of these obligations, moreover, abrogated 
workers’ personal freedoms in various ways.  The character of 
employment law in the late nineteenth century thus involved a kind of 
subordination that co-existed uneasily with the fact that work is “the 
prototypical voluntary behavior” on liberalism’s own principles.103 
There are numerous examples of these substantive rights and 
obligations rooted in feudal hierarchy that were still very much alive in 
nineteenth century American employment law,104 but the most salient 
are those limiting workers’ freedom to quit and those limiting collective 
action to improve working conditions.105  The tort of enticement 
dominated the courts’ regulation of workers’ collective action, and 
demonstrates the ancient nature of the judicial regulation of labor well 
into the nineteenth century: that action had remained more or less 
constant for the six centuries prior.106  The basic reasoning was that 
someone who “enticed” workers (servants) away from their work (or 
“induce[d] him to leave his master”), in this case for the purpose of 
holding out for higher wages, was liable for damages to the master.107  
Enticement was often the basis for a charge or complaint of conspiracy, 
and was on occasion used to prosecute concerted work stoppages aimed 
at conditions such as non-payment of wages.108 
 
102. See ORREN, supra note 98, at 68–117. 
103. Id. at 24. 
104. To take just one example, the principle of quicquid acquietur servo acquietur domino—
whatever is acquired by the servant is acquired by the master—comes down in a direct line from a 
legal feature of villeinage, that anything acquired by him belonged to his lord.  In the United 
States, it was applied all the way through the late nineteenth century in the “moonlighting” 
context to allow an employer to recover not only for any hours missed (and, of course, to dismiss 
the worker) but actually to recover wages earned in the second job.  This particularly underlines 
the personal, not abstract or fungible, nature of the employment relationship, at least in the 
direction of the duty from employee to employer.  Id. at 78–79. 
105. The right to quit, which judges generally formally protected within master-servant law, 
was greatly circumscribed by the “performance of the entire contract” rule (and its interpretation 
to allow employers to have almost any reason for discharge) for wages due, together with the long 
span between pay periods.  Although technically, employers also could not end the contract 
without cause, in practice, courts allowed them almost any cause; whereas whether the servant 
had just cause to leave was largely determined by the opinion of the master.  Id. at 84–86. 
106. Id. at 122–28. 
107. Id. at 123. 
108. Id. at 124. 
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Drawing upon such common-law materials, the evolving law of labor 
conspiracies came to authorize injunctions against concerted action in 
the very late nineteenth century, giving rise to the (in)famous 
“government by injunction.”109  Shifting and variable conceptions of 
property were instrumental in grounding these labor injunctions.110  The 
Sherman Act, once it was applied to worker collective action, became 
another powerful tool to ground and expand the labor injunction (it also 
allowed recovery of damages).111  The common-law bases for 
injunctions and the old law of labor conspiracies died out as the modern 
employment relation was born with the New Deal.  The Sherman Act, 
meanwhile, only grew in both practical and symbolic prominence.  And 
while the Act’s application to labor seemed to be cut short by the New 
Deal, in truth it merely went underground, whence it continued to exert 
influence and send up shoots. 
B.  The Sherman Act and Its Relationship to Labor 
The Sherman Act was not originally intended to apply to the 
activities of labor unions qua labor unions nor to worker collective 
action.112 
First, the Act was largely a product of the republicanism that was 
current among much of the populace, the legislature, and the labor 
movement in the late nineteenth century; that republicanism was quite 
inconsistent with the prohibition of workers’ collective action to 
improve their working conditions. Generally speaking, this 
republicanism supposed that American society promised its members “a 
basis of real equality” that had “economic and social,” not only legal or 
formal, dimensions.113 It has been well documented that American 
public opinion was constellated against the unprecedented 
concentrations of capital in the post-Civil War era, and that this opinion 
 
109. See generally FORBATH, supra note 20, at 59–97.  The seminal, near-contemporaneous 
text that documented the use of the labor injunction (and whose authors went on to become two 
of the architects of the New Deal framework that succeeded it) was Felix Frankfurter and Nathan 
Greene’s THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930). 
110. BENSEL, supra note 84, at 342; FORBATH, supra note 20, at 85–88. 
111. BENSEL, supra note 84, at 343. 
112. Cf. Herbert Hovenkamp, Labor Conspiracies in American Law, 1880-1930, 66 TEX. L. 
REV. 919, 951 (1988) (suggesting that the “consensus view” is that the Act was intended to apply 
to labor). 
113. See, e.g., TOMLINS, supra note 85, at 34–35 (1985) (discussing the revolutionary 
generation’s outlook for the future after the newfound liberty and independence brought by the 
American Revolution). 
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cut across party lines.114  President Grover Cleveland had this to say in 
1888:   
As we view the achievements of aggregated capital, we discover the 
existence of trusts, combinations, and monopolies, while the citizen is 
struggling far in the rear or is trampled to death beneath an iron heel. 
Corporations, which should be the carefully restrained creatures of the 
law and the servants of the people, are fast becoming the people’s 
masters.115 
President Benjamin Harrison echoed him shortly afterward.116 
Senator Sherman himself had become an outspoken critic of trusts a few 
years before.117  Antitrust was part of the political and legal response to 
this unprecedented aggregation of economic power.118  The republican 
orientation of the Sherman Act was much more concerned with 
preserving small, traditional industry and business in the face of the 
new, large enterprises, than it was with consumer protection, which was 
likely a minor concern at best.119  It was even less concerned with 
abstract ideals of free trade.  This is evident in the fact that Senator 
Sherman was not opposed to tariffs, while the late nineteenth century 
“advocates of free trade” were.120  This republicanism was inconsistent 
 
114. Joseph L. Greenslade, Labor Unions and the Sherman Act: Rethinking Labor’s 
Nonstatutory Exemption, 22 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 151, 152–54 (1988); Elinor R. Hoffman, Labor 
and Antitrust Policy: Drawing a Line of Demarcation, 50 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 9–19 (1983). 
115. EARL W. KINTNER, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 
AND RELATED STATUTES 58 (1978). 
116. Id. at 60. 
117. Notably, the reason we call it antitrust regulation is that the law of corporations was still 
fairly restrictive; trusts were the comparatively unfettered vehicles chosen by early industrialists 
to conglomerate investment until the corporate form was “liberalized” and became the primary 
vehicle of raising investment for commercial activity. 
118. See, e.g., TOMLINS, supra note 85, at 29–30 (characterizing them as mostly “symbolic,” 
and describing how antitrust was part of the contemporaneous “debates over the aggregation of 
economic power”). 
119. Werner Troesken, The Letters of John Sherman and the Origin of Antitrust, 15 REV. 
AUSTRIAN ECON. 275, 291 (2002). 
Taken as a whole, the Sherman letters undermine the traditional view that consumers 
lobbied for, and supported, antitrust because the trusts were increasing prices.  All of 
the letters Sherman received regarding antitrust were from small businesses, and only 
one of these businesses, the John Deere Company, complained about pools and 
combinations driving up prices. 
Id. 
120. Id. at 287. 
The belief that reducing tariffs would help solve the trust problem was widely shared 
by nineteenth century observers and advocates of free trade. . . . During the same 
period, Democrats in both the house and senate introduced bills that would have 
eliminated tariff protections in any industry dominated [by] monopolistic trusts.  
Senator Sherman, however, continued to support high tariffs and opposed using tariff 
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with punishing worker collective action.  In fact, some of the core 
embodiments of republicanism in the nineteenth century involved 
collective action by workers,121 in the craft tradition122 and beyond into 
the more radical tradition of the Knights of Labor.123 
Second, in addition to this profound inconsistency with the original 
animating sentiments behind antitrust, the legislative history expressly 
supports the conclusion that the Sherman Act was not intended to 
punish worker collective action.  Richard Bensel concludes that “one of 
the clearest themes in the legislative history was the notable reluctance, 
even opposition, to including labor unions within the act’s scope.”124  
Joseph Greenslade cites the many senators who expressed worry that 
the bill might be applied to prevent “the laborers of the country . . . 
[from] combin[ing] either for the purposes of putting up the price of 
their labor or securing for themselves a better position in the world,”125 
to whom Senator Sherman replied: “combinations of workingmen to 
promote their interests, promote their welfare, and increase their pay . . . 
are not affected in the slightest degree, nor can they be included in the 
words or intent of the bill.”126  Legislators’ statements during the 
passage of the later Clayton Act also support this ascription of intent, as 
they expressed their disbelief that the courts had applied the Sherman 
Act against combinations of workers.127  Attorney General Richard 
Olney, a former railroad lawyer and certainly not an economic radical, 
called the application of the Sherman Act to “the combination of 
laborers known as a strike” a “perversion of a law from the real purpose 
of its authors.”128 
Greenslade also provides a convincing counter-explanation for the 
main point relied upon by the “consensus view” within antitrust, that the 
 
reductions to combat the trusts. 
Id. 
121. William Forbath, Ambiguities of Free Labor in the Gilded Age, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 767, 
800–12 (describing “labor’s anti-capitalist republicanism” as offering a competing interpretation 
of republican liberty to the narrow interpretation endorsed by Gilded Age, classicist courts). 
122. See generally TOMLINS, supra note 85, at 32–59. 
123. ALEX GOUREVITCH, FROM SLAVERY TO THE COOPERATIVE COMMONWEALTH: LABOR 
AND REPUBLICAN LIBERTY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 98–102 (2015) (“The Knights were 
the first post-Civil War labor organization open to nearly all workers, including unskilled, black 
and women workers . . . .”  Labor republicans “were united by their use of republican ideas to 
criticize wage-labor and to present cooperation as an alternative.”). 
124. BENSEL, supra note 84, at 342–43. 
125. Greenslade, supra note 114, at 155 n.30. 
126. Id. at 155 n.33. 
127. Id. at 160. 
128. 1893 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. xxvii–xxviii (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Sherman Act was meant to inhibit worker collective action.  He points 
out that a specific amendment exempting labor was considered but not, 
in the end, adopted.  In fact, Sherman did propose such an amendment 
to his original bill, and the Senate adopted it.  However, statements of 
the consensus view usually leave out the fact that the Judiciary 
Committee then rewrote the bill, shifting the emphasis from Sherman’s 
original language, which had focused upon effects on consumer prices, 
to the idea of restraint of trade.129  When the new bill came out of 
committee, the same senators who had complained of the possible 
distortion of the bill to punish “workingmen” were silent, presumably 
because they did not worry that worker collective action would be 
considered a restraint of trade.130 
It would be wrong to read back into these legislators’ intent, a 
century of development in antitrust doctrine and economic theory.  
Remember that price-fixing was not yet the obvious wrong that it would 
become with the full transition to neoclassicism.  Without express 
language about consumer prices, it was far from clear what a “restraint 
of trade” really was; that concept was in massive flux at that time.  The 
fact that the courts went on to define it the way they did cannot be read 
back into the legislative intent. 
Yet the Sherman Act, originally the child of a republicanism that 
opposed huge conglomerations of capital and sought to protect the small 
enterprise and artisan of traditional American economic life, soon 
enough became a weapon against the working people who labored for 
those new conglomerations.  What happened? 
C.  Parity: A Bridge from Feudal Labor Regulation to Modern Trade 
Regulation 
The classicists took on the application of the Sherman Act to punish 
worker collective political and economic action as an affirmative 
project, seeking a kind of parity between capital and labor in the Act’s 
application.  To be sure, this doctrinal project must be understood in 
terms of the larger movement in law (deference to business 
corporations’ decision-making) of which it was a part,131 and in light of 
the still-larger policy project that movement served (building the 
 
129. Greenslade, supra note 114, at 155–56. 
130. Id. at 158. 
131. See, e.g., TOMLINS, supra note 85, at 21–30 (describing the critical role of legal 
institutions in their “regulation of property rights and promotion of economic development”—
and, thus, in bringing about an increasing deference to business corporations’ decision making—
even and especially against local regulation). 
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national market society).132  In this Section, I consider how this broader 
context informed the basic concepts (of freedom of contract and free 
trade) employed within the cases.  I argue that the doctrinal project was 
deeply embedded in a sense of social hierarchy between buyers of labor 
and sellers of labor—a hierarchy anchoring control over workers by 
those who employed them—which was not cognizable on official 
freedom of contract principles.  The method by which classicists 
achieved this aim contained a kind of double-speak regarding the 
ascription of moral and legal agency to working people, which then 
manifested in the early judicial decisions applying the Sherman Act to 
worker collective action.  Even had classicists not expressly invoked 
this hierarchical and coercive legal tradition, the context of legal 
subordination of labor in which the idea of parity operated rendered it 
problematic, if not paradoxical.  I contend that these paradoxes rest 
ultimately upon an equivocation in the meaning of the “freedom” 
invoked in the jurisprudence.  
1.  The Argument from Parity 
Recall that classicist principles favored the freedom to compete—
including the freedom to vertically compete; that is, for actors in 
adjacent markets to compete.  The fact that classicists sought to curb 
workers’ freedom in this regard, that is, to compete with capital by 
acting collectively to withhold labor upon condition, thus requires 
explanation.  Before any courts addressed the issue, classicists argued in 
treatises and other publications that there ought to be parity between 
capital and labor in respect of their freedom to combine in furtherance 
of their efforts to vertically compete (with consumers, and with labor on 
capital’s part, and with capital on labor’s part).133  The argument from 
parity then could be the claim that a particular instance of vertical 
competition (between sellers of labor and buyers of labor) is unfair, 
because one side is being subjected to strictures (regarding the ability to 
exert collective power) that the other is not.  In other words, if business 
is going to be subject to these restrictions, then, out of fairness, labor 
should be as well.  Thus, the classicists were perhaps concerned with 
horizontal competition only insofar as differential restrictions on 
 
132. See generally BENSEL, supra note 84, at 289–354 (discussing the construction of the 
“national market”). 
133. See Hovenkamp, supra note 112, at 926–32 (describing the common-law treatise 
tradition’s strong bent toward characterizing the law of combinations as treating “labor 
combinations more favorably than business combinations” and urging that “the public policy 
toward labor combinations ought to be the same as the policy concerning cartels”). 
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combinations to limit that competition affected the balance of power 
between capital and labor in vertical competition.  Prominent lawyer 
Arthur Eddy wrote: 
The object of decisions and laws against combinations being to protect 
the consumer against maintenance of price at abnormal levels, it 
would naturally be supposed that both laws and decisions would be 
directed impartially against combinations of both labor and capital; 
that no discrimination would be made, since a combination of one 
may affect prices in exactly the same way as a combination of the 
other; but so far from there being no discrimination, it is well-settled 
[that labor combinations are legal while capital combinations are 
not.]134 
Eddy’s concern was “fairness” and “impartiality” in the application 
of a rule, whatever its content, not with furthering the purposes of the 
rule itself.135  Lamenting the application of the “strict” rule of consumer 
protection to capital while it is not applied to labor, he was moved to 
comment: “The manifest injustice, not to say absurdity, of this condition 
of things appeals to every fair-minded man.”136 
The assertion of this “unfairness” was arguably made with a 
presupposition of the very social hierarchy that neutrally applied 
freedom of contract principles ought to have condemned.  In other 
words, in asserting that antitrust law’s failure to punish worker 
collective action was unfair, classicists betrayed a normative 
commitment to a hierarchy between workers and employers that should 
have been anathema to them.  Many classicists felt that the balance of 
power between capital and labor was already tilted in labor’s favor.  
Among the reasons they cited (for the background imbalance of power 
between capital and labor) was America’s supposed labor shortages.137  
But Hovenkamp also describes a more surprising strain that 
“dominated” classicist thinking about labor: classicists’ concern with 
 
134. ARTHUR EDDY, THE LAW OF COMBINATIONS: CONTRACTS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE 
1331 (1901) (emphasis added). 
135. That Eddy, in particular, was not particularly interested in the consumer protection 
content or purpose of the rule itself is also suggested by, among other things, the fact that he was 
personally responsible, in his capacity as a corporate lawyer, for organizing the National Carbon 
Company (out of many previously existing carbon companies), which soon controlled 75% of the 
worldwide carbon market, as well as having a key helping hand in the incorporation of several 
other massive oligopolies.  Big Carbon Firms Combine: Three-Fourths of This Industry in the 
World Included, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1899, at 1. 
136. EDDY, supra note 134, at 1331. 
137. Hovenkamp, supra note 112, at 930. 
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the relative social mobility between the working and owning classes in 
the United States (as compared, for example, to Europe). 
Equally important was the perception of easy worker mobility that 
dominated most nineteenth century thought: any American laborer 
could save a little money, borrow from others, and become an 
entrepreneur himself.  As treatise writer Theodore Sedgwick observed 
as early as 1836, New England laborers could “lay up half their 
wages” and within a few years they could either “settle as farmers in 
the new states” or “undertake an independent business in the old.”  On 
the other hand, “[i]n Europe, the common rule [was], once a servant, 
always a servant; once a mechanic, always a mechanic; once a tenant, 
always a tenant . . . .”138 
Such a “rule” would in fact be a barrier to market entry, a violation of 
the most fundamental classicist principles.  Construing the absence of 
the rule as an imbalance in labor’s favor suggests an underlying 
commitment to the  hierarchical suppression of workers’ freedoms  as 
the natural order of things. 
Direct reliance upon hierarchy by the classicists aside, there may be 
enduring reasons to consider the distinctiveness of labor contracts, 
which might pose problems for a categorical argument from parity.  A 
strong version of this distinctiveness is articulated by theorists from 
Marx to Polanyi: if labor is a “fictitious commodity” then it is 
nonsensical to posit an equivalence between its sellers and sellers of 
actual commodities.139  However, it is not necessary to embrace the 
strong version of this critique to see that labor contracts have some 
distinctive features that might pose problems for a simple-minded 
argument from parity.  The republican tradition, which was associated 
with the Sherman Act, certainly recognized this distinctiveness.  Labor 
republicans pointed to the hierarchy inherent in labor contracts together 
with the differentials in both market power and wealth between the 
parties that came to characterize such contracts, allowing employers to 
unilaterally set terms.140  A growing strand of contemporary labor 
economics recognizes these same dimensions of distinctiveness.141  
 
138. Id. at 931. 
139. POLANYI, supra note 82, at 75 (“Commodities are . . . objects produced for sale on the 
market . . . .  But labor, land, and money are obviously not commodities . . . .  Labor is only 
another name for a human activity which goes with life itself, which in its turn is not produced for 
sale but for entirely different reasons, nor can that activity be detached from the rest of life, be 
stored or mobilized . . . .”). 
140. GOUREVITCH, supra note 123, at 106–16 (discussing the labor republicans’ idea of the 
distinctiveness of labor contracts: “material domination” grounded in absence of wealth on the 
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2.  Implementing Parity in the Courts 
The early wave of antitrust cases that implemented what I have been 
calling the argument from parity, applying the Sherman Act to regulate 
and punish worker collective action, relied upon the ambiguity in the 
meaning of free trade that was mentioned earlier.  It is in these cases 
that the meaning of “free flow of trade” is brought into clear relief, for 
here (unlike in, for example, the economic due process cases) it operates 
in logical opposition to freedom of contract rather than in harmony with 
it.  These cases protected the free flow of trade—necessary to the 
constitution of new markets, particularly the national market—against 
workers’ liberty interests in collective economic and political action 
with respect to their working conditions and livelihoods.142  In doing so, 
they invoked a long tradition of subordinating workers and their 
interests to their employers’ and to other societal interests, expressly 
relying upon their status as workers to do so, contrary to what freedom 
of contract would prescribe.  This early interpretation of the Sherman 
Act was also the bridge to the modern, neoclassicist antitrust framework 
that would take the application of the Act to labor, absent a specific 
statutory exemption, for granted. 
a.  The Workingmen’s Amalgamated Case: Three Ambiguous “Evils” 
The story of how the bridge was built begins with a massive general 
strike in New Orleans that grew primarily out of the desire of drayage 
drivers (“draymen”) and warehouse workers to improve their wages and 
working conditions.143  The actions included the coordinated stoppage 
 
part of workers; market power on the part of employers allowing them to unilaterally set terms, 
namely long hours and low pay; and the hierarchy and control implied by all the contract “left 
unsaid,” requiring the worker to “passively obey the commands of the employer”). 
141. See, e.g., ALAN MANNING, MONOPSONY IN MOTION (2003) (focusing especially upon 
differentials in market power and wealth as creating economic inefficiencies). 
142. This Subsection focuses primarily on a close reading of the first published decision to 
apply the Sherman Act in this way, with the aim of demonstrating the continuity with the earlier 
tradition of labor regulation as well as the ambiguity in the use of the concept “free trade.”  It is 
not the only significant decision from the Gilded Age period to apply the Sherman Act against 
workers.  Some other decisions are discussed, though more briefly, infra.  Moreover, the same 
year as Workingmen’s Amalgamated, see supra Part II.C.2.a, another federal district court also 
applied the Sherman Act to worker collective action.  However, in that case, what the court 
considered the special regulatory and factual situation of the railroads (which were presumed to 
justify greater judicial intervention in labor disputes, through the device of judicial receivership 
and on the basis of additional statutes specific to the railroads) played a crucial part in the court’s 
reasoning.  Waterhouse v. Comer, 55 F. 149, 154 (S.D. Ga. 1893). 
143. United States v. Workingmen’s Amalgamated Council of New Orleans, 54 F. 994, 995 
(E.D. La. 1893); FORBATH, supra note 20, at 71 (“The first application of the Sherman Act to 
industrial strife occurred in a tumultuous New Orleans longshoremen’s strike, which tied up the 
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of work (the work, primarily, of transporting goods to and from the Port 
of New Orleans), public demonstrations, attempting to persuade others 
to join in the stoppage, and finally, the participation of other workers in 
the city not directly involved in the transportation of these goods.144 
The relatively brief district court opinion allowed an injunction to be 
issued against various workers’ organizations that had organized the 
work stoppage and pickets.145  The opinion hardly reads as if it were 
deciding a tremendously significant issue of first impression: namely, 
whether the new Sherman Act should in principle apply to the collective 
action of workers to improve their working conditions.  Rather, it 
disposes with that issue as if it were a mere preliminary.146  The 
decision was significant because not only was it the first decision to 
apply the Sherman Act to worker collective action, but also because the 
Supreme Court’s seal of approval on that extension of the Act, about a 
decade and a half later, specifically endorsed it.147 
The Louisiana district court stated the primary legal question it was 
deciding was whether the facts before it were “for the purpose of 
restraining . . . commerce.”148  In support of the court’s conclusion that 
“there can [not] be any question but that the combination of defendants 
was in restraint of commerce,”149 we can glimpse three possible 
wrongs: (1) coercion, such as violence or intimidation, directed by some 
workers or combinations of workers toward other workers with the aim 
of preventing them from working; (2) the simple fact of “slowing” or 
“stagnating” commerce, by whatever means and for whatever end; and 
finally, (3) the individually voluntary and coordinated decisions by 
numerous workers to cease (or slow) their work, conditioned upon some 
improvement in the terms and conditions of work for all.  Of these, the 
last is the only one that may plausibly translate into the contemporary 
antitrust framework: an intentional constriction of supply aimed at 
influencing price (or at influencing other terms of the bargain, which 
neoclassicists would consider equivalent to price). Wrongs (1) and (2) 
played important, possibly dispositive, roles in the Workingmen’s 
Amalgamated decision; yet neither can be translated into the 
 
city’s interstate and foreign commerce.”). 
144. Workingmen’s Amalgamated Council, 54 F. at 995, 999–1000. 
145. Id. at 1000. 
146. Id. at 996. 
147. See Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 310 (1908) (endorsing the extension of the Sherman 
Act). 
148. Workingmen’s Amalgamated Council, 54 F. at 995. 
149. Id. at 999. 
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contemporary framework, and Wrong (3) must be read in the context of 
both.  Further, Wrong (3) itself is put forth not merely as a special 
instance of the general proposition, “sellers of commodities may not 
constrict supply in order to influence price,” but rather as the specific 
proposition, “workers may not stop working in order to influence wages 
and working conditions.” 
In the opinion, Wrongs (1) and (2) are immediately evident in the 
court’s initial statement of the issue.  The court first described the 
decision made by workmen’s organizations to “discontinue business” 
including “transporting goods which were being conveyed from state to 
state, and to and from foreign countries.”150  When employers 
attempted to replace the union workers with non-union workers, they 
were met with “intimidation springing from vast throngs of the union 
men assembling in the streets, and in some instances by violence” 
(Wrong (1)).151  The result was that, by the intentional acts of the 
defendants, “not a bale of goods constituting the commerce of the 
country could be moved” (Wrong (2)).152  The question was, did these 
facts establish a cause under the statute?  If the admittedly “lawful” 
organizations of workmen “adopt and further unlawful purposes and do 
unlawful acts . . . the associations themselves become unlawful.”153  So 
far, so clear.  Everything then rode on what the “unlawful purposes” and 
“unlawful acts” were.  The court answered that question as follows: 
“The evil, as well as the unlawfulness, of the act of the defendants, 
consists in this: that, until certain demands of theirs were complied with, 
they endeavored to prevent, and did prevent, everybody from moving 
the commerce of the country” (Wrong (3)). 154 
The “certain demands,” of course, consisted not in ransoms or some 
other inherently illegal purposes, but in moderately improved working 
conditions and wages, together with recognition of a collective 
bargaining representative (demands that, incidentally, would later 
become state-sanctioned purposes in the New Deal society).  It is not 
academic to note this, because in the law of combinations from which 
the court was here borrowing, overtly nefarious and illegal aims were 
often the actual aims of the combinations at hand.  In the identification 
 
150. Id. at 1000 
151. See id. (leaving aside the question of what shall count as coercion or intimidation in such 
circumstances, and granting arguendo that at least some actions that would legitimately qualify as 
unlawful harassment or coercion occurred). 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
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of the workers’ “certain demands” with “evil,” (i.e., Wrong (3)), we see 
the bridge to neoclassicism.  In the “endeavoring to prevent everybody” 
we see the operation again of Wrong (1), which was probably necessary 
to justify the result in the classicist period.  In the “from moving the 
commerce of the country,” we see Wrong (2), the threat posed by 
workers’ choice not to work. 
i.  Violence and Coercion Toward Unwilling Third Parties 
Beginning with Wrong (1): was the “evil” the courts ascribed to the 
workers, “prevent[ing]” others from “moving the commerce of the 
country” or refusing to move the commerce of the country themselves?  
The former does a great deal of work in the opinion.  Yet plainly, the 
defendants did not prevent “everybody” from doing so; plenty of 
individuals, including the defendants themselves, refused to do so quite 
voluntarily.  The court had before it a voluminous evidentiary record 
resulting from the parties’ vigorous contestation of precisely how 
significant or extensive the defendants’ efforts were in preventing others 
from moving the commerce of the country.  The court of appeal, in 
affirming the district court, noted that the latter had wide discretion to 
decide that factual contest as it apparently did,155 but the district court 
opinion itself contained no express finding of fact regarding the extent 
of any violence or coercion directed at willing and able workers.  On the 
contrary, the court acknowledged the vast number of coordinated, 
voluntary individual decisions by workers that comprised the strike, 
describing the matter before it as a “gigantic and widespread 
combination”—implying voluntary decisions to agree—among the 
workers of New Orleans, spanning a “multitude of separate [workers’] 
organizations,” all aimed at a work stoppage that would get the attention 
of those who profited from the “whole business of the city,” who were 
also the ones who controlled the economic and material circumstances 
of the conspirators’ lives.156  Indeed, it is fairly plain that if there had 
not been widespread agreement among a large number of workers to 
engage in the action—that is, if there had not been a critical mass of 
voluntary individual decisions involved in the coordinated action—the 
City, the employers, and the court would not have bothered with it in 
the first place.  Not even the district court opinion ever really denied 
this. 
 
155. Workingmen’s Amalgamated Council of New Orleans v. United States, 57 F. 85 (5th 
Cir. 1893) (issuing a single-page, summary affirmance). 
156. Workingmen’s Amalgamated Council, 54 F. at 995. 
15_PAUL FINAL .DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/2/2016  10:19 AM 
1008 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  47 
Yet, it seems that the court also predicated its antitrust analysis to a 
great extent on the proposition that intimidation “in some instances by 
violence” of others (employers or third-party workers) became a central 
means of the collective action, that is, Wrong (1).  This idea pervades 
the opinion.  Even after articulating Wrong (3) toward the end of its 
discussion, the district court chooses to end the opinion by again 
identifying the central evil at hand as the improper coercion of others, 
together with the halting of commerce—namely, a repetition of Wrongs 
(1) and (2), with no mention of the “certain demands,” Wrong (3), that 
allegedly motivated both: 
 It is the successful effort of the combination of the defendants to 
intimidate and overawe others who were at work in conducting or 
carrying on the commerce of the country, in which the court finds 
their error and their violation of the statute.  One of the intended 
results of their combined action was the forced stagnation of all the 
commerce which flowed through New Orleans.  This intent and 
combined action are none the less unlawful . . . .157 
This is striking not only in that this crucial proposition is never truly 
endorsed by the fact finder.  It is remarkable also in that, in order to 
proscribe such conduct, or combinations of men employing such means, 
the court had no need to invoke the Sherman Act in the first place.  
Such combinations would already have been illegal under any 
interpretation of the common law at the time, and not just as a matter of 
economic regulation.  It seems that the court went out of its way to 
apply the new statute. 
ii.  Interrupting Commerce by Refusing to Work 
The conception of free trade as “the uninterrupted flow of trade” 
allowed the court to effectively require workers to work in order to 
prevent “a restraint of trade,” that is, a violation of the Sherman Act.  
The court’s concern with building and protecting the nascent national 
market is evident in its articulation of this requirement. 
In its short decision, the court repeatedly stated that the workers 
stopped, and intended to stop, commerce by not working: “threatened 
that . . . all the men . . . would leave work”; “the whole business of the 
City of New Orleans was paralyzed”; “flow of commerce . . . [was] 
purposely arrested”; “transportation of the goods and merchandise from 
the government warehouses to the landings was forcibly stopped”; 
“enforced a discontinuance of labor in all kinds of business, including 
 
157. Id. at 1000 (emphasis added). 
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the business of transportation of goods and merchandise which were in 
transit through the city of New Orleans”; “not a bale of goods 
constituting the commerce of the country could be moved”; “forced 
stagnation of all the commerce which flowed through New Orleans”; 
“should the journeymen bakers refuse to work.”158  In most of these 
instances, the court mentions the interruption of work and commerce as 
a stand-alone fact, not conditioned upon a demand of improved wages 
or conditions—demonstrating that it saw it as an evil in itself (not as an 
evil only if used to influence price). 
Indeed, the court at one point actually seemed to reason that 
“secur[ing] . . . the employment of none but union men” is not in itself 
the wrong; this, of course, is the potentially monopolistic purpose that a 
contemporary court (putting aside for a moment the labor exemption) 
might condemn.  Rather, it suggested that the wrong is the means—
halting work, and thereby commerce—by which that purpose was 
achieved, putting a primacy on the interruption of commerce by the 
refusal to work: 
 The defendants urge . . . that the combination to secure or compel 
the employment of none but union men is not in the restraint of 
commerce.  To determine whether the proposition urged as a defense 
can apply to this case, the case must first be stated . . . .  The 
combination setting out to secure and compel the employment of none 
but union men in a given business, as a means to effect this 
compulsion, finally enforced a discontinuance of labor in all kinds of 
business, including the business of transportation of goods and 
merchandise which were in transit through the city of New Orleans, 
from state to state, and to and from foreign countries.  When the case 
is thus stated . . . I do not think there can be any question but that the 
combination of the defendants was in restraint of commerce.159 
The court very clearly stated that in order to determine whether the 
defendants’ pursuit of “the employment of none but union men” in 
certain industries was legal, it had to consider the means defendants 
employed to secure this aim.  Because those means consisted in “a 
discontinuance of labor in all kinds of business”—significant and 
voluminous business constituting interstate commerce—there could be 
no question but that the combination was in restraint of commerce.  This 
is a precise inversion of neoclassical antitrust analysis, which would be 
concerned with the potentially monopolistic end.  Instead, it evidences 
 
158. Id. at 995–96, 999–1000. 
159. Id. at 999 (emphasis added). 
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the old obsession with workers who dare to not work, as one of the 
greatest social threats around.160 
In that older line of thinking, workers’ status within commerce is as 
objects, not as agents, and any expression of their agency within that 
sphere is an affirmative threat.  Expression of agency aimed at the 
purpose of not working, thereby threatening commerce, is the most 
threatening of all.  This brings out the fundamental paradox of this 
notion of parity, which ascribes to workers the status of commercial 
agents (in the result) as well as objects (in the reasoning). 
Once again, as with Wrong (1), the court relied upon the old 
common-law tradition regulating workers, in order to find a violation of 
the Sherman Act in their collective action to improve their working 
conditions.  While Wrong (1) demonstrates the logical superfluity of the 
court’s invocation of the new Act, Wrong (2) reveals how the court 
relied upon the hierarchical and coercive character of the common-law 
tradition with respect to workers, in doing so. 
iii.  A Work Stoppage Aimed at Improvement of Working Conditions 
And what of the sole “evil” identified by the court that we may 
translate into a contemporary antitrust framework?  As I have argued, it 
is not possible to interpret the court’s holding as consisting only or even 
primarily in this, for the following reasons.  First, the opinion is shot 
through with repeated invocations of Wrongs (1) and (2).  As argued 
above in the discussion of Wrong (2), the court expressly stated that the 
evil was the means employed—that is, the cessation of work to interrupt 
commerce.161  And, on the heels of its single viable identification of 
Wrong (3) as an evil in itself, it again returned to its exaggerated focus 
upon the coercion of third parties—almost as if it felt it immediately 
had to buoy up insufficiently firm ground.  Thus, I do not think there is 
a viable reading of the opinion in which the court primarily grounds the 
application of the Sherman Act to worker collective action upon Wrong 
(3). 
However, assuming arguendo that Wrong (3) was one of the court’s 
grounds of decision, the justification for it, too, was based upon ancient 
notions of hierarchy and control.  That is because the court’s 
condemnation of workers’ conditional work stoppage was in terms that 
are highly specific to the workers’ status as workers, rather than 
generally as sellers of commodities (of which labor, in the market 
 
160. ORREN, supra note 98, at 71–75. 
161. Workingmen’s Amalgamated Council, 54 F. at 999. 
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society, happens to be one type).  For its holding that this conduct is a 
violation of the Sherman Act, the court relied upon an old state court 
case applying the common law of labor combinations, whose elements 
are specific to the acts of workers, not sellers of commodities in general.  
The court spoke not of price-fixing, constriction of supply, or distortion 
of price.  Instead, it had no sooner mentioned the workers’ “certain 
demands” as comprising an aspect of the “evil” under the statute, than it 
was quoting a then-sixty-year-old New York criminal case that spoke 
and reasoned in terms of workers qua workers, and whose holding was 
limited to workers: 
What is meant by “restraint of trade” is well defined by Chief Justice 
Savage . . . .  “Should the journeymen bakers refuse to work unless for 
enormous wages, which the master bakers could not afford to pay, 
should they compel all journeymen in the city to stop work, the whole 
population must be without bread . . . .  Such combinations would be 
productive of derangement and confusion, which certainly must be 
injurious to trade.”162 
The quote and the case it was taken from are instructive regarding the 
court’s perspective on worker collective action.163  People v. Fisher, 
upon which the Workingmen’s Amalgamated district court relied in 
order to hold that the New Orleans strike was a restraint of trade and 
thus a violation of antitrust law, had applied the common law of 
criminal conspiracy to punish an 1833 “conspiracy to raise wages” by 
the journeymen shoemakers of Geneva, New York.164  The New York 
case held that journeymen, who are paid wages by the masters, commit 
a crime by withholding labor on condition of higher wages—not that 
sellers commit a crime by combining to inflate prices in the product 
market.  So in applying the argument from parity to extend a piece of 
commercial regulation to workers on the theory that they are sellers of 
commodities and thereby subject to that regulation, the court relied 
upon sixty-year-old precedent regarding workers’ combinations, not 
regarding combinations of merchants.  Moreover, every single point of 
authority, most of them English cases and statutes, collected in Fisher 
regard workers collectively withholding labor to affect wages or 
 
162. Id. at 1000 (quoting People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. 9 (N.Y. 1835) (emphasis added)). 
163. Note that it also again makes reference to the workers’ “refus[al] to work,” long-
connected with the idea of social “derangement and confusion,” in a manner that seems to go 
beyond the “enormous wages” themselves.  Thus, in one of the few passages in the opinion that 
articulates Wrong (2)—the only one that could make the journey into contemporary antitrust 
analysis—the long shadow of Wrong (3) again appears.  Fisher, 14 Wend. at 19. 
164. Id. at 15. 
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working conditions.165  The Fisher opinion also invoked statutes 
regulating workers’ combinations dating to the “reign of Edw[ard] VI 
and Geo[rge] III, which subject workmen conspiring either to reduce the 
time of labor or to raise their wages, to the punishment of fine and 
imprisonment,” that is, to the repressive, highly status-specific 
regulation of the eras 1547–1553 and 1760–1820, respectively.166  Not 
one point of authority contained in Fisher regarded sellers of 
commodities collectively engaged in constricting supply in order to 
influence price; all concerned workers. 
In other words, Fisher reasoned and spoke in terms of what it is 
appropriate for workers to do and not do, not in terms of what it is 
appropriate for sellers of commodities to do and not do.  This seems to 
betray a view of workers that is somewhat in tension with the idea that 
they are simply an instance of the category “seller of a commodity”—
for otherwise, why not frame the principle in terms of the latter?  The 
tradition of social control of working people embodied in the common 
law of employment, which is expressly continued in Fisher and invoked 
as authority in Workingmen’s Amalgamated, in fact views workers as 
having a distinct status meriting specific, coercive legal treatment.167  
This may not be surprising in the context of Fisher, but should be 
surprising in the context of Workingmen’s Amalgamated.  After all, that 
was the decision that purported to extend to workers the free agency 
applied to men of commerce—to bring parity to how workers and 
businessmen were treated in the economic regulation of their collective 
action.168 
Fisher in fact represented the far end of the spectrum in terms of the 
American common law’s repression of workers.  William Forbath 
identified it as among a “famous handful of cases in the first quarter of 
the [nineteenth] century [that] seemingly held mere combinations to 
raise wages criminal. . . . These cases are the basis of the view that 
American labor law’s trajectory over the nineteenth century was one 
from repression toward relative toleration.”169  The first court to apply 
 
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
167. ORREN, supra note 98, at 71–75. 
168. Not only is the court’s reasoning entirely specific to workers qua workers, but it 
expressly reasons from outcomes—the reasonableness of the prices set for labor in the overall 
social order (a consideration that would not be allowed in the neoclassical framework, wherein 
the reasonableness or social utility of the prices set is no defense to anticompetitive conduct, as 
set out further in Part IV, infra). 
169. FORBATH, supra note 20, at 60 n.2. 
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the Sherman Act to worker collective action aligned itself with the far 
end of the common law’s spectrum of worker “repression,” a feudal 
tradition of ancient vintage that viewed workers as lower in the social 
order than those for whom they worked, and thereby for many purposes 
not entitled to free agency over their actions. 
The purpose for which the court invoked its age-old power to 
subordinate workers’ economic and political freedom was that of 
avoiding “derangement and confusion” that would be “injurious to 
trade.”170  In other words, it was the specific project of constructing a 
continuous national market and the emerging market society: ensuring 
that capital could earn a “reasonable” rate of return,171 enough to ensure 
continuing development, production, and investment.  The judicial 
project of market construction thus paralleled the economic and 
physical project of building railroads, factories, and taming new natural 
resources, and it required abrogating workers’ political and economic 
freedom to accomplish. 
b.  The Danbury Hatters Case 
Loewe v. Lawlor,172 better known as the Danbury Hatters case, grew 
out of one of the first union label boycotts, or coordinated “sympathy 
strikes,” and in it, the Supreme Court “confirmed what a majority of 
lower federal courts”—Workingmen’s Amalgamated and United States 
v. Debs173—“had previously held: “that the Sherman Act applied to 
 
170. United States v. Workingmen’s Amalgamated Council of New Orleans, 54 F. 994, 1000 
(E.D. La. 1893) (quoting Fisher, 14 Wend. at 19). 
171. BENSEL, supra note 84, at 289–354 (“The Political Construction of the National 
Market”).  Consider the more obvious arm of this judicial market-building enterprise: the Lochner 
line of substantive due process cases, in which “any regulatory act that prevented a person or 
corporation from earning a reasonable return on invested capital was deemed a constitutional 
violation.”  Id. at 334.  The same courts invoked the same language—”unobstructed” or “free,” 
“flow” or “course,” of “trade” or “commerce”—in both lines of cases to signify the same larger 
project. 
172. 208 U.S. 274 (1908). 
173. United States v. Debs, 64 F. 724, 729 (N.D. Ill. 1894).  Debs arose out of the national 
Pullman strike, “the web of sympathetic boycotts of Pullman cars by the American Railroad 
Union in response to Pullman’s ruthless wage cuts and his intransigent refusal to confer with his 
employees.”  FORBATH, supra note 20, at 74.  To “virtually all of the nation’s legal elite, 
conservative and reformist alike,” the strike became a symbol of an anarchic threat posed by 
industrial unionism.  Id.  The federal judiciary responded with the usual sweeping injunctions, 
also many times calling in federal troops and presiding over mass arrests, although there was little 
violence or property damage before the crackdowns.  Judge William H. Taft wrote in 
contemporaneous letters to his wife: “Until they have had much bloodletting, it will not be better” 
and “They have killed only six of the mob as yet.  This is hardly enough to make an impression.”  
Id.  Debs and other union officers were prosecuted under, inter alia, the Sherman Act; the 
Supreme Court denied their writ of habeas corpus on alternate grounds, namely Congress’s 
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combinations of workers.”174  As painfully chronicled by William 
Forbath in his seminal work on the Gilded Age judiciary’s effect upon 
the labor movement, the saga was devastating to the morale of that 
movement, sucking many of its resources in those key years and 
robbing it of some of its most successful tactics.175 
Significant as it was in its impact, Danbury Hatters delved no deeper 
into the justification for bringing worker collective action under the 
Sherman Act than had Workingmen’s Amalgamated.176  In fact, the 
Supreme Court largely relied on the reasoning of the Louisiana federal 
district court on this point, quoting it at length for the proposition that 
workers were not to be exempted from the Sherman Act.177  Other than 
that lengthy excerpt, the only other reasoning the Court offered for its 
application of the Sherman Act to worker collective action was this 
assertion: “The records of Congress show that several efforts were made 
to exempt, by legislation, organizations of farmers and laborers from the 
operation of the act, and that all these efforts failed, so that the act 
remained as we have it before us.”178  As an inference about legislative 
intent, this is likely incorrect.179  It is also incorrect that any such 
amendments “failed”: the only one that was proposed in fact passed, 
and no amendment was proposed to the rewritten bill (and thus could 
not have failed).180  As an assertion that there did not at that time exist 
an express labor exemption, it is of course true, but that alone does not 
answer the question whether the Act ought to regulate worker collective 
action. 
The Court also quoted Workingmen’s Amalgamated’s statement of its 
central holding (in addition to its statement that the Sherman Act applies 
to workers), apparently adopting its reasoning for why worker collective 
action was a restraint of trade under the Sherman Act,181 and thereby 
perpetuating its reliance upon the common law’s repression of free 
action by workers qua workers. 
 
authority over interstate commerce, particularly as exercised in various statutes specific to 
railroads and the carriage of the mails. 
174. FORBATH, supra note 20, at 92. 
175. Id. at 92–94. 
176. The Court did not rely on any of the reasoning of the district court in Debs, simply noting 
that its affirmance on alternate grounds was not meant to disapprove the lower court’s application 
of the Sherman Act.  Loewe, 208 U.S. at 298–99. 
177. Id. at 301–02. 
178. Id. at 309–10. 
179. See supra Part II.B. 
180. Id. 
181. Loewe, 208 U.S. at 302. 
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Even more directly, although it refrains from itself articulating its 
principles in terms that rely upon workers’ status qua workers, the 
Danbury Hatters opinion included the following reliance on authority: 
 The combination charged falls within the class of restraints of trade 
aimed at compelling third parties and strangers involuntarily not to 
engage in the course of trade except on conditions that combination 
imposes; and there is no doubt that (to quote from the well known 
work of Chief Justice Erle on Trade Unions) “at common law every 
person has individually, and the public also has collectively, a right to 
require that the course of trade should be kept free from unreasonable 
obstruction.”182 
This (“the course of trade should be kept free from unreasonable 
obstruction”)183 is the same concept of free trade employed in 
Workingmen’s Amalgamated.  Such obstruction includes not only 
affirmative acts of interference, but also, it turns out, the omissions of 
not working, if those omissions are entered into collectively and 
deliberately.  The free flow of national trade had to be protected because 
building the national market was a priority for the Court. 
Again, the project of building the emerging market society met (and 
relied upon) the status-specific tradition of restrictions upon workers’ 
freedom of action.  There was no further elaboration, footnote, or 
explanation in the opinion regarding the “well known” source 
mentioned, which was a treatise relating to workers and their 
organizations, not to sellers of commodities or trade combinations 
generally.  Sir William Erle was at one time Chief Justice of the Court 
of Common Pleas, and a member of the Commission on Trade Unions 
created by Parliament to make recommendations to it, and who later 
authored The Law Relating to Trade Unions.184  Erle seemed to endorse 
then-current English common-law ideas about what it was proper for 
workingmen to do vis-à-vis the free flow of trade.  For example, 
deciding whether a group of workers could be convicted under the 1823 
Master and Servant Act for willfully absenting themselves from their 
work in a shipyard, he had in another case written: 
[The statute] was meant to protect persons who had heavy contracts to 
complete within a certain time, and to give them a summary remedy in 
case their workmen left them without a reasonable excuse.  Under 
some circumstances a person employed to do a particular job would 
 
182. Id. at 294–96 (emphasis added). 
183. Id. 
184. WILLIAM ERLE, THE LAW RELATING TO TRADE UNIONS (1869). 
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not be the servant of his employer, but not when the employment is 
such as in this case.185 
In other words, that statute was meant to protect commerce from 
workmen (not working).  This is the very theme that pervades the 
Workingmen’s Amalgamated opinion.  The “free flow of commerce” 
argument thus justifies curtailing workers’ political and economic 
freedom to organize for betterment of their conditions. 
3.  The Corporate Exemption 
The key move in the foregoing cases—relying upon the ambiguity in 
the concept “free trade” in order to curtail workers’ freedoms for the 
purpose of constructing the emerging market society—is brought into 
especial relief when we consider the same courts’ and thinkers’ attitude 
toward business corporations.  In the Gilded Age, labor collective action 
was prosecuted far more than businesses’ under the Sherman Act.186  
Beyond this, businesses had little need to engage in overt price-fixing, 
for a combination of the “corporate exemption” and the relative lack of 
regulation of mergers allowed them to simply collect market power 
within individual firms. 
Classicism actively promoted that central device of business 
combination, the corporation, as a site of economic and ultimately 
political power.  As previously mentioned, early corporations were 
quasi-public creatures that operated under a web of constraints for 
specific state-sanctioned purposes, not legal forms used to collect 
capital while limiting liability.187  These constraints were gradually 
lifted over the course of the nineteenth century, via various changes in 
the law of corporations that increasingly insulated owners and 
shareholders from liability while enabling the separation of ownership 
 
185. Lawrence v. Todd (1863) 143 Eng. Rep. 562, 14 C.B. (N.S.) 554; ROBERT J. STEINFELD, 
COERCION, CONTRACT, AND FREE LABOR IN THE 19TH CENTURY 145, 151 (2001).  In another 
case, the Chief Justice wrote, in deciding whether a wage statute applied: “We should look at the 
work done and the position in life of the parties.”  Id. at 145. 
186. EDWARD BERMAN, LABOR AND THE SHERMAN ACT 271 (1930) (explaining that the first 
twenty cases prosecuted under the Act targeted worker collective action to improve working 
conditions); BENSEL, supra note 84, at 342–43. 
187. HOVENKAMP, supra note 85, at 13–14 (noting that the distinguishing elements of the pre-
classical corporation were “not its structure or its ability to assemble capital” but rather its 
“special contract (charter) with the state, permitting the incorporators to do something that no one 
else could do”); TOMLINS, supra note 85, at 24 (describing the “decline of the corporation as a 
public body and the appearance, by the end of the second decade of the nineteenth century, of a 
new archetype: ‘the modern business corporation, organized to pursue private ends for individual 
gain’”). 
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and control.188  During the Gilded Age, the innovation of additional 
legal doctrines beyond the law of corporations allowed these new 
creatures to fully spread their wings: into the industrial production 
process, into surrounding markets, and into a powerful and enduring 
role in the polity.189 
Regarding corporations’ legal status as combinations, the justification 
seemed to draw in part from their prior status as creatures operating in 
the public interest,190 eventually evolving into efficiency justifications 
based on economies of scale and on emerging concepts of scientific 
management and production.191  The selective approval of classicists 
(and their immediate predecessors) for the “co-operation” embodied in 
business combinations, composed of men of their own class, in contrast 
to their ambivalence or hostility toward the co-operation of men and 
women who contributed their physical labor to society, was widely 
noted at the time.192  Herbert Hovenkamp has surveyed the comparative 
treatment of business and labor combinations by Gilded Age theorists 
and courts, concluding that labor combinations got the short end of the 
stick for structural reasons rather than due to overt bias.193  While a 
fuller exploration will have to be saved for future work, there are 
considerations that suggest that bias and structure in fact worked 
together to create this result.  Adam Smith (who may be presumed an at 
least neutral observer) commented upon the selective disapprobation far 
earlier.194  That vintage is an indication of the ancient social attitudes 
 
188. HOVENKAMP, supra note 85, at 14–16. 
189. TOMLINS, supra note 85, at 16–20 (explaining the consolidation of corporate control over 
industrial production, previously controlled independently by workers or craft organizations); see 
id. at 25–30 (detailing the triumph of corporate decision making over state and local regulation of 
local markets). 
190. TOMLINS, supra note 85, at 23. 
191. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 112, at 938–40 (discussing contemporaneous 
commentators’ arguments that business combinations result in increased efficiencies, lower 
overall prices, and better product quality). 
192. See, e.g., Francis B. Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 HARV. L. REV. 393, 420 (1922) 
(“[W]hy should the law be such that if two steel workers plan a certain act which the law regards 
as tortious, they should be subject to fine and imprisonment; but if, let us say, the United States 
Steel Corporation plans and executes the self-same action, the criminal law should be unable to 
touch it?”). 
193. Hovenkamp, supra note 112, at 965 (“Labor combinations received the same treatment. 
But the unique structure of the labor market—easy entry and no economies of scale—meant that 
the new law had far harsher impact on labor combinations than seller cartels.”). 
194. He stated: 
We rarely hear, it has been said, of the combinations of masters, though frequently of 
those of workmen.  But whoever imagines, upon this account, that masters rarely 
combine, is as ignorant of the world as of the subject.  Masters are always and 
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that contributed to this view.  Classicists also seemed to view enhanced 
business profits as a social good in a way that they did not regard wage 
premiums.  That, of course, is an unprincipled distinction even before 
introducing normative commitments to workers’ welfare.195  It can even 
be glimpsed in classicists’ sweeping statements that business 
“cooperation” was necessary for social progress.  For example, the same 
Arthur Eddy who had urged the extension of the Sherman Act to labor 
organizing had this to say: 
Social progress would be impossible were if not for co-operation and 
combination; therefore the law encourages and recognizes the 
formation of— 
1. Partnerships 
2. Voluntary associations 
3. Corporations 
All of which are combinations in every sense of the term—a 
corporation being simply the co-operation of two or more individuals 
in a form of combination prescribed by law.196 
Yet, in what Hovenkamp calls Eddy’s “trite apology” for business 
combinations, the latter asserted that business combinations “are all in 
the direction of more for less money,” while “labor unions and farmers’ 
organizations are all in the direction of less for more money.”  It is 
difficult to read Eddy’s use of “more” and “less” here as a non-
perspectival view from nowhere.  More, his inclusion of farmers’ 
organizations on the side of labor rather than business also suggests a 
clear identification with a specific economic (and political) class and 
associated interests, rather than some neutral distinction (assuming 
 
everywhere in a sort of tacit, but constant and uniform, combination, not to raise the 
wages of labour above their actual rate.  To violate this combination is everywhere a 
most unpopular action, and a sort of reproach to a master among his neighbours and 
equals.  We seldom, indeed, hear of this combination, because it is the usual, and, one 
may say, the natural state of things, which nobody ever hears of.  Masters, too, 
sometimes enter into particular combinations to sink the wages of labour even below 
this rate.  These are always conducted with the utmost silence and secrecy till the 
moment of execution. 
ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 60 (1776). 
195. See Hovenkamp, supra note 112, at 940 (“When mainstream American political 
economists around 1900 viewed business combinations, they saw increased efficiencies from 
economies of scale, lower overall prices, better product quality, and higher profits.”).  Note that 
the inclusion of “profits” in this category is rank hypocrisy even on this outlook’s own principles, 
because its analogue, higher wages, would never be seen as an independent good and in fact 
would be viewed as an inefficiency.  On neoclassical economic theory, too, profits (beyond what 
is needed to compensate the opportunity cost of capital) are by definition inefficient. 
196. EDDY, supra note 134, at 1327. 
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arguendo that there is such a principle that would justify harsher 
treatment for labor) between sellers of labor and sellers of other 
commodities.   
At any rate, as with prosecuting worker collective action under the 
Sherman Act, the courts endorsed the classicist outlook on business 
combinations in their construction of the Act.  In United States v. Joint-
Traffic Ass’n, “the Court  . . . directly addressed” the anxiety, raised in 
an earlier dissent, that the Court’s broadening of the common-law rule 
on price-fixing might “carry the implication that . . . business 
organizations . . . violated the Sherman Act” in themselves.197  We 
might call the Court’s removal of this doubt the corporate exemption, to 
parallel the labor exemption that the courts rejected.  
This combination of the corporate exemption with the relative 
toleration for mergers meant that business had less need to engage in 
overt price-fixing.  While “the government was generally more 
successful in prosecuting labor unions than industrial combinations 
[under the Sherman Act],” “[w]ith respect to industry, [the Act] became 
moribund . . . even as corporate mergers and combinations swept the 
American economy.”198  Together with the corporate exemption, this 
meant that large industrial actors’ consolidation of market power was 
largely unregulated: collective action that took place within a business 
firm was entirely immune, while the relatively permissive attitude 
toward mergers allowed firms to attain market shares that gave them 
market power, often of monopolistic magnitudes.  Meanwhile, workers’ 
attempts to act collectively in order to improve the terms of their labor 
for these firms were prohibited and punished by the Act. 
The bottom line is that corporations, once legally formed, were 
simply not treated as combinations anymore at all, but as single units.  
Not so for workers’ combinations, and certainly not so for ad hoc 
workers’ combinations that came together for particular instances of 
collective action.  Indeed, even assuming that a particular workers’ 
organization were considered legal, once it struck, the law viewed the 
acts as those of individuals in a combination, rather than a single unit 
(in contrast to the acts of the employer, a business organization).199 
 
197. HYLTON, supra note 13, at 94; see United States v. Joint-Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505, 
567 (1898) (“[T]he formation of corporations for business or manufacturing purposes has never, 
to our knowledge . . . been regarded in the nature of a contract in restraint of trade or 
commerce.”). 
198. BENSEL, supra note 84, at 342–43. 
199. Still, at least the classicists spoke expressly of the corporation as a combination.  In the 
modern understanding, the concept is so entrenched that the fundamental unit in antitrust analysis 
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III.  THE LABOR EXEMPTION: AN UNSTABLE PARADIGM 
The doctrine that the Gilded Age courts had created, applying the 
Sherman Act to limit and punish worker collective action, went largely 
underground during the New Deal era.  There it was fertilized by the 
emerging neoclassical consensus in antitrust, and was undisturbed by a 
deferential labor exemption that built around it instead of uprooting it.  
The labor exemption case law was a part of the New Deal paradigm 
of economic regulation, and also an especially charged symbol of it.  
Within the New Deal paradigm, the market society that had been 
constructed during the Gilded Age in large part through cooperation 
between courts and industry, now expanded to include a place for 
collective bargaining by workers.  Unions left the legal shadows, 
becoming market actors alongside business firms.  This new paradigm, 
on the one hand, embraced a vision where economic life was governed 
in tripartite fashion by the state, capital, and organized labor.  At the 
same time, it rarely articulated that vision, much less a set of underlying 
principles in support of it.  This was in contrast to the market 
framework that it partially displaced, and with which it partially 
coexisted.  The theory behind antitrust policy, by contrast, was 
increasingly seen as near-scientific and as transcending normative 
contestation.  Together, these factors resulted in a period of “normal 
science” of the labor exemption.200 
The law of the labor exemption thus largely ceded ideological 
primacy to the market framework, even as the results it prescribed 
staked out a temporary bulwark against that framework’s most extreme 
and violent manifestations: carving out a place for limited economic 
democracy for a limited number of working people for a limited period 
of time.  At the same time, it perpetuated the idea of “two rival policies” 
 
is “the firm” (whether a corporation, partnership, or individual).  The labor exemption when it 
appeared at the dawn of the New Deal period only partially equalized this state of affairs, because 
the parallel system for regulating labor combinations was quite onerous, and continued to 
essentially impose a tradeoff upon organized labor for allowing the combination in the first place, 
thus continuing to view it as a combination.  In other words, while business corporations may not 
combine to engage in concerted action targeting a competitor or to raise prices, a business 
corporation on its own is viewed as a single actor, and thus there are no restrictions on its conduct 
paralleling the restrictions contained in the NLRA.  See generally TOMLINS, supra note 85. 
200. I use here the notion of “normal science”—coined in THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE 
OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 5 (1962), and subsequently applied in descriptions of a huge variety 
of fields (science and otherwise)—to describe the period after a “paradigm shift,” when the focus 
is on implementing and clarifying the new paradigm rather than on basic or first principles. 
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that were fundamentally opposed.  This opposition went hand in hand 
with an acceptance of the basic premise that the policy of antitrust 
would in fact prescribe a different result for worker collective action 
than the law of the labor exemption did.  The law of the labor 
exemption both expressly and implicitly endorsed this premise. 
A.  The Norris-La Guardia Act 
The text, structure, and operation of the labor exemption reinforced 
both the primacy of antitrust and the supposed separateness of the 
principles and values upon which labor and trade regulation, 
respectively, rely.  The Norris-La Guardia Act,201 one of the first pieces 
of New Deal legislation, although it partially revived and then operated 
together with the labor provisions of the earlier Clayton Act, came to 
define the ethos of the labor exemption.  The text of the Norris-La 
Guardia Act does not engage directly with the framework it is 
modifying, hardly articulates its own principles, and seems to be the 
product of a conscious decision to so demur. 
Unlike the Clayton Act, which was the first legislative attempt at a 
labor exemption from antitrust,202 the Norris-La Guardia Act did not 
grapple directly with trade regulation in subject matter—even with how 
trade regulation applies to labor—although it had the effect of 
modifying its reach.  Norris-La Guardia is not an antitrust statute.  
Instead, it is incorporated into Title 29 (“Labor”) of the United States 
Code.  By contrast, the Clayton Act was conceived and written as an 
antitrust statute, was incorporated into Title 15, the antitrust and trade 
regulation section of the Code, and portions of it dealt with matters 
other than labor. 
 
201. Act of Mar. 23, 1932, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101–115 
(2012)). 
202. Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, § 1, 38 Stat. 730, 730 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 
12 (2012)).  Section 20 of the Clayton Act had limited the availability of injunctions in disputes 
relating to the terms and conditions of employment.  Id. § 2, 38 Stat. at 738 (codified as amended 
at U.S.C. § 52).  Those provisions were nearly laid flat by the pre-Roosevelt Supreme Court in 
Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, which held that the union’s objective (a closed shop) and method 
(secondary boycott) were illegitimate, and thus fell outside the statute (thus also creating an 
opening for courts to import additional extra-statutory understandings of legitimate objectives and 
methods back on the part of working people).  254 U.S. 443, 477–78 (1921).  United States v. 
Hutcheson (discussed for other purposes, infra) revived section 20 by reading the Clayton Act in 
conjunction with Norris-La Guardia, holding that together they protected the enumerated 
activities from both injunctions and actions for damages.  312 U.S. 210, 211 (1940).  
Interestingly, Duplex Printing on its face did not hold that a strike for higher wages would be an 
illegitimate activity and thus would not be protected by the labor exemption.  This reflects the fact 
that the courts of this period were still not consistently applying neoclassicist analysis, under 
which such an action would be classic price-fixing—assuming antitrust applies to labor. 
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In content, Norris-La Guardia also does not deal directly with the 
subject matter, provisions, or logic of trade regulation.  Its text does not 
include any reference to antitrust or to the Sherman Act, nor to the 
subject matter of its provisions.203  Norris-La Guardia’s central edict is 
the following: 
No court of the United States, as defined in this chapter, as defined in 
this chapter, shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or 
temporary or permanent injunction in a case involving or growing out 
of a labor dispute, except in a strict conformity with the provisions of 
this chapter; nor shall any such restraining order or temporary or 
permanent injunction be issued contrary to the public policy declared 
in this chapter.204 
The statute then goes on to enumerate acts, involving or growing out 
of a labor dispute, that a court may not enjoin,205 and to set out the 
conditions that shall define “involving or growing out of a labor 
dispute.”206  Nowhere does it refer to restraints of trade or to 
monopolies—the central subjects of the Sherman Act—or attempt to 
redefine them as they relate to labor.207  Again, by contrast, the Clayton 
Act famously asserted: “[T]he labor of a human being is not a 
commodity or an article of commerce.”208  That proposition directly and 
 
203. The only section in which it even approaches the subject matter of antitrust is when it 
states, derivatively of its central provisions: 
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue a restraining order or 
temporary or permanent injunction upon the ground that any of the persons 
participating or interested in a labor dispute constitute or are engaged in an unlawful 
combination or conspiracy because of the doing in concert of the acts enumerated in 
section 104 of this title. 
Act of Mar. 23, 1932, ch. 90, § 5, 47 Stat. at 71 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 105) (emphasis 
added).  Even this speaks more to common-law conspiracy than antitrust, for the latter is specific 
about its subject matter—restraint of trade—unlike the common law, which could relate to any 
illegal act or predicate. 
204. Id. § 1, 47 Stat. at 70 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 101). 
205. Id. § 4, 47 Stat. at 70 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 104). 
206. Id. § 13, 47 Stat. at 73 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 113 (a), (b), and (c)). 
207. This is not entirely surprising, in that Norris-La Guardia was aimed not just at antitrust, 
but more generally at what was then often called the “government by injunction” legislated by 
Gilded Age courts in the domain of labor.  In this, the courts had used antitrust, to be sure, but 
also the old common-law concepts of conspiracy and property interests of the employer, to justify 
blanket injunctions against worker collective action.  Yet, as to either theory of liability, the Act 
was equally pragmatic and results-focused in approach.  There is simply less reason to comment 
on its failure to grapple with the property-based common-law bases for liability because those, 
unlike the Sherman Act, are no longer used (although, as I argued in Part II, supra, their vestiges 
may live in the Sherman Act, and others have argued that their vestiges live in statutory labor 
regulation as well). 
208. Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, § 6, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
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forthrightly challenged antitrust law’s application to labor, for if labor is 
not a commodity, then it is nonsensical to speak of restraining trade in it 
or of fixing prices in it.  The Norris-La Guardia Act offered no 
analogous rationale for its limitations of the effect of antitrust regulation 
upon labor. 
William Forbath described the momentum that fueled the Norris-La 
Guardia Act in two stages: the first, dominated by the more old-
fashioned “rights talk” of the trade unionists, and the second, which 
resulted in the bill that was actually passed, dominated by the ascendant 
Progressive architects of the New Deal, notably Felix Frankfurter.209  
Forbath’s emphasis is on the degree to which these two approaches 
were laissez-faire or statist: distrustful of the government’s involvement 
in labor matters (the first, union-dominated phase) or optimistic about 
its possibilities (the second, Frankfurter-dominated phase).  Another 
difference, implicit in his account, is the extent to which the two 
approaches met the theory of liability that they challenged head on, in a 
clash of principles (the first phase), or opted for a more pragmatic, 
results-oriented approach (the second phase).210  The approach that won 
out was the pragmatic, results-oriented statutory text just discussed.  
Saving the statute from constitutional scrutiny may have been the most 
pragmatic course at the time,211 but the manner of doing so also set the 
tone for the “normal science” period of the statute to follow.  Although 
Norris-La Guardia revived Clayton’s labor provision, it imposed the 
 
§ 17 (2012)).  It also stated: 
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce.  Nothing 
contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation 
of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purposes of 
mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or 
restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the 
legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be 
held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under 
the antitrust laws. 
Id. 
209. More generally, the second version of the legislation was associated with “the men and 
women who after 1932 became ‘New Deal attorneys’ and the builders of a ‘new American 
state,’” a community of which Frankfurter was emblematic and, in a basic sense, helped to create.  
FORBATH, supra note 20, at 165. 
210. Forbath notes that “the vocabulary of Marx’s Capital finds a strange echo in the words of 
‘pure and simple trade unionist’ [Andrew] Furuseth,” as he testified before Congress: “Now, if 
you are going to permit this kind of expansion of the word ‘property’ to cover every human 
relation, you set up a condition, gentlemen, under which the creator, the human being who 
through his creative power . . . has created certain property, you make that man fall down on his 
knees and worship what he himself has produced.’”  Id. at 161 (internal citations omitted). 
211. Id. at 164. 
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cost of replacing its “rights talk” with its own pragmatic ethos.  We see 
this in the labor exemption case law, which displays a general 
orientation toward effects over principle, and which in turn enabled the 
implicit primacy of antitrust policy over labor policy. 
B.  Solidification of the Paradigm 
The transitional and foundational cases that came to define the 
normal science period showed no signs of reviving the rights talk of an 
earlier wave of challenges to the operation of the market society.  
Instead, these pivotal, paradigm-solidifying cases largely endorsed the 
primacy of antitrust, and reinforced the premise that absent a labor 
exemption, antitrust would regulate and often bar worker collective 
action. 
1.  Apex Hosiery 
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,212 decided by a very different Supreme 
Court than the one that had decided the key pre-New Deal precedents, 
came close to being something other than what it was.  It is the sole 
decision that approached the proposition that the Sherman Act, on its 
own terms, does not apply to a large swath of worker collective action, 
and that is not an entirely unreasonable reading of the opinion.213  Yet a 
closer reading shows that the opinion actually affirmed the default 
applicability of antitrust law to worker collective action, failing some 
specific exception, and in so doing ratified its primacy.  Moreover, the 
reasoning for carving out the exception again relied upon the 
affirmative New Deal labor legislation that had just passed and 
incorporated its limits. 
The Court began by expressly rejecting the proposition that the 
Sherman Act does not apply to the concerted actions of workers to 
improve their wages and working conditions.  Particularly notable are 
the grounds it gave for doing so: “On the contrary Congress has 
repeatedly enacted laws restricting or purporting to curtail the 
application of the Act to labor organizations and their activities, thus 
recognizing that to some extent not defined they remain subject to 
it.”214 
 
212. 310 U.S. 469 (1940). 
213. See Susan Schwochau, The Labor Exemptions to Antitrust Law: An Overview, 21 J. LAB. 
RES. 535, 542 (2000) (stating Apex Hosiery “rested not on any statutory labor exemption, but on 
construction of the Sherman Act itself”). 
214. Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. at 488. 
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Here the Court expressly stated the point I have been urging 
regarding the development of the labor exemption and the default 
assumptions that it embedded in the law regarding the intersection of 
trade regulation and labor regulation: that the judicial construction of 
the Sherman Act in the classicist period, as applying to worker 
collective action, was actually preserved as the underlying rule even in 
the New Deal period, although its effects were greatly curtailed. 
Having held that the activities of combinations of workers to better 
their terms of work are by default “subject to” antitrust regulation and 
prosecution, the Court then went on to hold that the particular acts in 
front of it were not antitrust violations.  Specifically, the Court held that 
taking labor costs out of price competition was not a violation of the 
Sherman Act: 
[S]uccessful union activity, as for example consummation of a wage 
agreement with employers, may have some influence on price 
competition by eliminating that part of such competition which is 
based on differences in labor standards.  Since, in order to render a 
labor combination effective it must eliminate the competition from 
non-union made goods . . . an elimination of price competition based 
on differences in labor standards is the objective of any national labor 
organization.  But this effect on competition has not been considered 
to be the kind of curtailment of price competition prohibited by the 
Sherman Act.215 
The opinion then immediately cited the recent New Deal labor 
legislation, offered in support of the proposition that legislative intent 
behind the Sherman Act was not to proscribe worker collective 
action.216  The Court thus relied upon the affirmative labor legislation 
recently passed for its conclusion that the effect of worker collective 
action on price competition—perhaps the core issue—does not render 
that concerted action barred by antitrust.  Sound reasoning or not, this 
rendered the Court’s holding apparently dependent upon that new labor 
policy, particularly given that it already stated that worker collective 
action is by default subject to antitrust.  Relatedly, and underscoring the 
same point, instead of overruling or disapproving of Loewe v. Lawlor, 
or any of the other classicist antitrust cases punishing worker collective 
action, Apex Hosiery distinguished them, another tacit endorsement of 
their basic logic.  It distinguished them on the basis that the case before 
 
215. Id. at 503–04. 
216. Id. at 504 n.24 (citing Norris-La Guardia, but also the Wagner Act and the Fair Labor 
Standards Act). 
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it did not involve secondary action, which had been prohibited because 
of the nature of the means rather than the nature of its effects,217 not 
because their effects on price competition were economically 
distinguishable. 
All this has two immediate implications.  First, it cedes significant 
ground to the emerging neoclassical antitrust framework by tacitly 
suggesting that there is no other reason why it ought not to apply—that 
but for a separately articulated statutory labor policy, there is indeed and 
ought to be a market for labor in all pertinent respects analogous to the 
market for products, justifying the same antitrust treatment for 
concerted action.  The Court did not offer a meaningful principled 
alternative to the neoclassical economic perspective that was coming to 
define antitrust. 
Second, the construction of the relationship between antitrust and one 
of the key objects of worker collective action was thus expressly limited 
by the New Deal labor framework’s thresholds of applicability: legally, 
employee status; and many times practically, the existence of a labor 
organization formed according to a complicated bureaucratic structure 
that would only become more complex and restrictive as the century 
wore on.  Those limitations are highlighted in today’s deregulation 
economy, in which those thresholds are increasingly absent.  Thus, even 
if the Court’s holding can be understood to construct the Sherman Act 
alone, its statement of that holding plainly limits that construction to 
limits placed by New Deal labor legislation.  Workers who fall outside 
the category “employee” are the most obvious evidence of the limits 
that have inhered in the law the entire time, but they may be figurative 
canaries in the coal mine. 
The greatest immediate legacy of Apex Hosiery, meanwhile, was its 
elevation of the distinction between labor markets and product markets 
(and whether a restraint in the labor market has a “substantial effect” in 
the product market), in the law of the labor exemption.218  This suggests 
a caveat to the reading I have offered, for the distinction between labor 
markets and product markets and its mention of the Clayton Act 
together may be read as a suggestion that the Court did, to some extent, 
endorse a basic distinction between the selling of labor and the selling 
of commodities.  Yet in light of the entire opinion, in particular its 
 
217. Id. at 505–06. 
218. This left future courts to determine how close the connection to the product market must 
be, for the act by the labor union to be within the ambit of the Sherman Act.  Schwochau, supra 
note 213, at 543. 
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reliance on affirmative labor legislation and its failure to articulate any 
principle for the distinction, this is best read as a minor strain. 
2.  Hutcheson 
That minor strain dissolved into a road not taken with United States 
v. Hutcheson.219  Even more directly than Apex Hosiery, the Hutcheson 
decision relied upon the Norris-La Guardia and Clayton Acts, regarding 
those together with the Sherman Act as a set of “interlacing statutes.”220 
Hutcheson read the Clayton Act’s proclamation that that certain 
activities by combinations of workers “shall not be considered or held to 
be violations of any law” in combination with Norris-La Guardia’s list 
of enumerated activities protected from injunction, essentially 
expanding that shield to immunize against not only requests for 
injunctive relief but actions for damages as well.  Hutcheson’s holding 
was broad and was a boon to the labor movement.  But despite its 
partial resuscitation of the Clayton Act, it ignored the minor strain in 
Apex Hosiery, and relied expressly on the statutorily defined labor 
exemption.  Instead of focusing on the distinction between the labor 
market and the product market, it “focused on the activities of labor 
organizations (due to the language of Clayton) and whether those 
activities fell within the class of activities exempted by Norris-La 
Guardia.”221  Because “future cases employed the Hutcheson line 
almost exclusively,”222 this removed any vestige of the concept that 
labor is not and ought not be treated as a commodity from the main 
thrust of the labor exemption case law, and redoubled focus upon 
construction of a list of exempted activities, for which no real principle 
had been offered in the statute nor in the decision. 
One reason Hutcheson had such immediate practical significance is 
that it removed the uncertainty left in the wake of Apex Hosiery 
regarding secondary actions by workers—“solidarity actions” (without 
which organized labor likely would not have amassed the political 
power necessary to pass New Deal labor legislation in the first 
place).223  This also may supply the explanation for why Hutcheson 
 
219. 312 U.S. 219 (1941). 
220. Id. at 232. 
221. Schwochau, supra note 213, at 544; Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 234 (reading the Clayton and 
Norris-La Guardia Acts together, to hold that the “bounds of a labor dispute” included, and 
therefore exempted, secondary action). 
222. Schwochau, supra note 213, at 544 (citing PHILIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION (1997)). 
223. Despite the draconian character of the official pre-New Deal precedent regarding 
antitrust and worker collective action, much worker collective action including secondary action 
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sidestepped the minor strain in Apex Hosiery and redoubled the focus on 
the affirmative statutory basis for an exemption.  For Apex Hosiery had 
affirmed the general principle that the Sherman Act applied to worker 
collective action, relying largely upon the old cases, and then 
distinguished those cases on the basis that they involved secondary 
action.  Thus, Hutcheson had to find some other basis for freeing 
secondary action from antitrust liability, and without overruling Apex 
Hosiery’s construction of the Sherman Act, it did so by holding that 
regardless of what the Sherman Act meant, the statutory labor 
exemption immunized secondary action. 
C.  The Normal Science of the Labor Exemption 
The normal science of the labor exemption framework solidified the 
suggestions in the foundational case law, largely adopting the relatively 
contingent threshold conditions of affirmative labor regulation rather 
than relying upon a principled distinction between labor markets and 
product markets (or some other principle), to define its boundary with 
antitrust.  This fed grumblings about the special treatment accorded 
labor.  It also led naturally to the result that independent contractor 
workers were subjected to antitrust liability, even while courts seemed 
to acknowledge their underlying status as workers. 
1.  Generally 
Because Hutcheson, not Apex Hosiery, was largely the basis for the 
normal science of the labor exemption, the exemption was largely 
defined by the list of exempted activities set out in Norris-La Guardia.  
The main body of labor exemption case law tended to ignore the minor 
strain in Apex Hosiery, which may have been suggestive of a principled 
distinction between labor markets and product markets on the Sherman 
Act’s own terms.  The normal science of the labor exemption was 
instead mostly concerned with policing the boundaries of the exempted 
activities, and of the category of traditional activities of labor unions. 
The normal science of the labor exemption was also defined to a 
great extent by its context, namely a basic economic policy of co-
governance by capital, the state, and labor.  The trucking industry was 
an excellent example of this, with the Interstate Commerce Commission 
(“ICC”) effectively setting rates in cooperation with industry and with 
 
did as a matter of fact take place, sometimes escaping the iron fist of the judiciary and sometimes 
provoking overt repression; this did in fact contribute to labor’s power, both economic and 
political.  FORBATH, supra note 20, at 141–47. 
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the Teamsters, the labor organization that represented a critical mass of 
truck drivers in the mid-twentieth-century period.224 
At the same time, the contemporaneous scholarly and policy 
commentary focused to a great degree upon the labor exemption as a 
symbol of a basic contest about economic worldviews that the New 
Deal era had not resolved, consisting as it did of a marriage between the 
official ideology of the market society with the actual practice of 
economic life.225  In a mid-century article that provides a window into 
this commentary, antitrust scholar Ralph Winter noted the “irrational” 
primacy of the labor exemption in the contemporaneous “debates over 
labor policy,” describing it (and the potential application of the Sherman 
Act to labor) as an “emotional symbol” of the clash of policies and 
perhaps worldviews.226  This description furnishes a clear contrast with 
the present day, where the labor exemption has been largely consigned 
to an arcane specialty practiced by a tiny subset of lawyers and receives 
little attention from scholars and almost none in the broader policy 
discourse.  This is partly because the juice that was fueling that 
emotional symbolism was the challenge, however attenuated, that New 
Deal practice posed to official market ideology. 
If the labor exemption itself had irrational primacy in policy debates 
in the mid-century period,227 then the supposed conflict between 
antitrust policy and labor policy was almost always a presupposition of 
those debates.228  That presupposition was harmonious with the position 
of industry, which was that the conflict was acute and that labor’s 
exemption from it was absolute and unprincipled, resulting in 
deleterious economic effects of significant magnitude.229 
 
224. BELZER, supra note 33, at 55. 
225. Id. 
226. Winter, supra note 15, at 16. 
227. The U.S. 1961–62 Intercollegiate Debate had as its topic: “Resolved: That Labor 
Organizations Should Be Under the Jurisdiction of Antitrust Legislation.”  LABOR & ANTI-TRUST 
LEGISLATION 1 (Harold S. Roberts ed., 1961); see also Comment, The Antitrust Laws and Labor, 
30 FORDHAM L. REV. 759, 759 n. 1 (1962). 
228. See, e.g., Bernard D. Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the Antitrust 
Laws, 6 J.L. & ECON. 152, 152 (1963) (positing a tension between national labor policies and the 
objectives of antitrust laws); see also ANTON G.O. SMITSENDONK, TRADE AND LABOR: TWO 
AMERICAN POLICIES 81–86 (1971) (same). 
229. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., Organized Labor and the Antitrust Laws—Industry’s 
View, in LABOR & ANTI-TRUST LEGISLATION, supra note 227, at 71 (“[I]t is a matter of timely 
information that a double standard exists in the application of the antitrust laws—one under 
which business monopoly is prohibited, and the other under which union monopolistic practices 
are freed of restraint.”). 
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2.  Normal Science Case Law and “Independent Contractor” Workers 
The prior statement, in Part I, that the labor exemption is receding 
through the mechanism of the independent contractor form, can now be 
restated as follows: the normal science labor exemption largely has no 
space for the newly ascendant forms of the labor relationship in the 
current period of breakdown—forms outside the category “employee.”  
The normal science case law also assumes as a factual matter the 
centrality and strength of labor organizations engaged in NLRA-based 
collective bargaining.  Both ways, it is primarily focused on border-
fixing issues.  The border defined by employee status was, as set out 
supra, imported into the labor exemption case law by the reliance upon 
the larger set of affirmative labor legislation of which Norris-La 
Guardia was a part.  The inevitable implications were then drawn out in 
the first cases dealing with independent contractor workers and the 
labor exemption.    
Taylor v. Local No. 7230 made the implications of Hutcheson and 
Apex Hosiery for workers outside the category “employee” concrete and 
explicit.231  In other words, it manifested the implications of the results-
focused reliance upon employee status embodied by Norris-La Guardia 
and the foundational case law, over the more principled distinction 
between labor and commodity earlier promised in the Clayton Act.  The 
latter distinction may have saved the conduct punished in Taylor, while 
the former did not.  The distinction between the two roads is especially 
dramatized by the court’s recognition, in Taylor, of the independent 
contractors as occupying the social and economic space of workers.  In 
this, they retained some of the pre-New Deal consciousness of who 
workers are apart from the “employee” label even as they apply the new 
legal demarcation to decide whether workers’ collective action will be 
saved from antitrust. 
 
230. 353 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1965). 
231. The U.S. Supreme Court’s very brief opinion in Columbia River Packers Ass’n v. 
Hinton, 315 U.S. 143 (1942), actually preceded Hutcheson and just followed Apex Hosiery.  It 
held that a fisherman’s union (affiliated with the CIO) was an organization of independent 
businessmen and sellers of commodities, not employees, and moreover, that the employment 
relationship was not the matrix of the controversy.  Id. at 147.  Thus, the fishermen’s collective 
refusal to sell to a particular dealer was not protected by the labor exemption.  Id.  The fishermen 
may have been among the earliest casualties of the presumption of antitrust liability solidified by 
the New Deal labor exemption.  I choose to discuss Taylor in greater detail for two related 
reasons.  First, it is a clearer illustration of the actual boundary of the labor exemption, because 
Columbia River Packers Ass’n at least involved sellers of a physical commodity rather than the 
sellers of pure labor or services.  Second, Taylor demarcates that narrower boundary after the dust 
had settled from the initial, defining labor exemption decisions, rather than while the ground was 
shifting. 
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Taylor applied the framework created by Hutcheson in applying the 
labor exemption to antitrust: 
[I]t is well settled that provisions of the Sherman, Clayton and Norris-
La[]Guardia Acts must be considered together in determining the 
scope of the exemption of union activities from the antitrust 
provisions; and, in the light of such consideration, the test to be 
applied in determining whether such activities are exempt is whether 
they present a case which can be said to involve or grow out of a 
“labor dispute.”232 
The court went on to adopt the suggestion of Milk Wagon Drivers233 
and Columbia River Packers Ass’n234 taken together, that unless either 
the parties stood in the relationship of employer and employee or the 
employment relationship was the “matrix of the controversy,” the labor 
exemption could not protect their conduct from antitrust liability.235  
Taylor engaged in a lengthy inquiry about whether the defendant 
horseshoers were in fact employees or independent contractors, 
concluding that because they were independent contractors, their 
concerted action was subject to prosecution.236 
Taylor thus extends the rule that Columbia Rivers Packers Ass’n had 
formulated for “sellers of commodities” to individuals whom the court 
itself plainly considers workers.  Unlike the earlier Supreme Court case, 
the Taylor court never used such words as “sellers of commodities.”  
Indeed, the term “independent contractor” itself is suggestive of the fact 
that the individual is primarily selling labor, not some physical fruit of 
labor.  The court certainly spoke as if it considers them workers, 
importing its social understanding of work: 
Pressures of economic necessity to work in order to provide for one’s 
family and to accommodate the needs of the person who is paying for 
 
232. Taylor, 353 F.2d at 602. 
233. Milk Wagon Drivers’ Union Local No. 753 v. Lake Valley Farm Prods., Inc., 311 U.S. 
91 (1940). 
234. 315 U.S. 143. 
235. Taylor, 353 F.2d at 604–05.  Milk Wagon Drivers held that disputes in which individuals 
engage in collective action can be immunized by the labor exemption if the employment 
relationship is the matrix of the dispute, even where the employment relationship at issue is 
someone else’s—thus effectively protecting secondary action, either in solidarity with other 
workers or targeting actors who do business with one’s employer.  Milk Wagon Drivers, 311 U.S. 
at 99–100; see also New Negro All. v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552, 560 (1938) (using the 
same reasoning to immunize a consumer boycott, aimed at employment practices, under the labor 
exemption).  Interestingly, this minor strain of jurisprudence, which has not been overruled, 
preserves an option for non-employee workers that has long since been closed off under the 
NLRA. 
236. Taylor, 353 F.2d at 597–600. 
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the services are applicable to every person engaged in a trade, calling 
or profession for gain and are not relevant considerations in 
determining whether one is an employee or an independent contractor.  
It goes without saying that independent contractors, as well as 
employees, must work to support themselves and their families and 
must make themselves available to render services at such times as 
they are needed.237 
The relevant distinction was at this point definitively not between 
“labor” and “commodity” (a possibility that the Clayton Act held out), 
but between workers who are “employees” and “independent 
contractors” (not even simply between those who are “employees” or 
not).  The court engaged in no discussion of what policy might be 
served by drawing the demarcation thus, but it certainly does import its 
own social understanding of how workers are supposed to 
“accommodate” the “needs” of those they are “serv[ing],” by “making 
themselves available to them.”  It clearly identified these “independent 
contractors” as “persons” engaged in “work,” in a “trade, calling, or 
profession.”  While one response to the suggestion of this Article may 
be that it is too difficult to draw the line between non-employees who 
are workers and those who are not for purposes of antitrust liability, 
Taylor demonstrates both that there is a fairly strong collective intuition 
(including on the part of conservative, pro-market courts) that such a 
category exists, and that it is not impossible to determine who is in it. 
The normal science case law as to independent contractor workers 
was generally in accord with Taylor,238 while providing for some 
exceptions to the general rule that worker collective action was 
completely barred by antitrust.  The exceptions are of limited 
application to the problem at hand.  First, a limited exception, based on 
American Federation of Musicians v. Carroll239 and its progeny, allows 
collective bargaining on behalf of independent contractor workers in 
certain circumstances.  The Carroll exception applies only where an 
established labor organization already represents a critical mass of 
employees in the workplace or sector, and is grounded in those other 
 
237. Id. at 597 (emphases added). 
238. See, e.g., L.A. Meat & Provisions Drivers Union, Local 626 v. United States, 371 U.S. 
94, 104 (1962) (antitrust barred independent contractor drivers from union membership); Spence 
v. Se. Alaska Pilots’ Ass’n, 789 F. Supp. 1007, 1011 (D. Alaska 1990) (union of independent 
contractor pilots impermissible under antitrust). 
239. 391 U.S. 99 (1968); see also H.A. Artists & Assocs. v. Actors’ Equity Ass’n, 451 U.S. 
704 (1981) (allowing collective-bargaining agreements that stage actors and actresses, 
independent contractors, entered into with major theatrical producers). 
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workers’ statutorily recognized interest in effective bargaining (not in 
the independent contractor workers’ interests).  The relevance of 
Carroll is profoundly limited for today’s independent contractor 
workers, in that traditional labor organizations have little density in the 
industries in which such workers labor.  This exception is also aimed at 
the “nonstatutory,” collective bargaining aspect of the exemption, rather 
than at unilateral worker collective action.  The second primary 
exception, based on the earlier Milk Wagon Drivers case, does reach 
unilateral collective action, but generally only protects independent 
contractor workers who are organizing specifically toward employee 
status, not those who are engaging in concerted action to directly better 
their conditions, or for other purposes.240 
IV.  ANTITRUST LIABILITY FOR WORKER COLLECTIVE ACTION: THE VERY 
IDEA 
As we already saw, the New Deal put a fairly abrupt stop to the use 
of antitrust law to quash most collective worker action in the manner 
that had been opened up by Workingmen’s Amalgamated and the 
Danbury Hatters case.  But as we also saw, the fundamental proposition 
that the internal logic of antitrust law required worker collective action 
to be subject to liability remained in the deep structure of the law, a 
legacy of those early cases.  Modern antitrust law thus directly inherited 
that proposition from Gilded Age courts, which expressly relied on a 
specific conception of the social good (one we would not now accept) to 
justify it.  At the same time, the ideology associated with modern 
antitrust created increasingly rigid divisions between the economic 
sphere of life and other spheres, notably the social and political spheres.  
In this final Part, I examine the maintenance of this underlying 
assumption in the present era as one contingent policy decision among 
many, which together constitute actual markets.  Maintaining the 
underlying rule involves normative commitments: making those explicit 
will allow us to decide whether they can be improved.  
 
240. Milk Wagon Drivers, 311 U.S. at 102–03.  The exception is further described in note 235, 
supra.  Note, further, that organizing specifically for improved wages and working conditions 
ought to be within the scope of this exception, so long as employee status is also among the aims 
(under the test that the dispute must relate to terms and conditions of employment). 
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A.  The Inherent Normative Content of Punishing Worker Collective 
Action Under Antitrust 
The modern justification for punishing worker collective action 
through antitrust law, no less than the classicist one and no less than a 
policy of exempting worker collective action, rests on specific 
normative judgments that are neither politically neutral nor self-
evident.241  The difference is that while the classicists were relatively 
overt and direct in their appeals to a specific conception of the social 
good—one which entailed a hierarchical suppression of workers’ 
agency in service of constructing a new market—in modern antitrust 
law that category of consideration (to say nothing of appeals to social 
hierarchy specifically) has gone largely underground. 
Antitrust law enshrines the ideals of the market society—
competition, open markets, and prices that are determined accordingly 
—and seemingly reinforces the idea of a “singular ideal type of 
market.”242  At the same time, it embodies the proposition that those 
ideals require affirmative state action for their realization: state policies 
that encourage “pro-competitive” conduct by commercial actors and 
discourage “anti-competitive” conduct. 
Antitrust law itself, leaving aside how it plays out in the price-fixing 
or boycott doctrine or its application to labor, is thus an embodiment of 
the fact that the market society is not some “natural” or default state of 
affairs but, on the contrary, the product of an affirmative and often 
costly set of policy decisions on the part of the state itself.243  Today, 
competition is something that courts undertake to promote, and various 
 
241. This argument, which I make here with respect to its relationship to labor, has been 
widely made with regard to modern antitrust law generally.  See, e.g., Michael S. Jacobs, An 
Essay on the Normative Foundations of Antitrust Economics, 74 N.C. L. Rev. 219, 226 (1995) 
(arguing that “the contemporary debate between antitrust economists demonstrates how efforts to 
base antitrust policy solely upon economic theory inevitably draw on political assumptions about 
the marketplace”; that “inconclusive evidence of the efficiency effects of many business 
practices, and the inability of economic theory to determine which model promises greater 
efficiency, expose these political assumptions and effectively transform the economics debate 
into a political one”; and that “antitrust discourse would benefit from the acknowledgment by 
policymakers that the current economic debate is theoretically and empirically irresolvable, and 
from their express recognition that the choice between conflicting economic models constitutes a 
normative ordering of divergent political beliefs”). 
242. Frank Dobbin & Timothy J. Dowd, The Market that Antitrust Built: Public Policy, 
Private Coercion, and Railroad Acquisitions, 1825 to 1922, 65 AM. SOC. REV. 631, 631 (2000). 
243. Id. (“In economic sociology, an emergent camp contends that antitrust and other policies 
actively constitute market characteristics.  These sociologists suggest that markets may take a 
variety of different forms rather than conforming to a singular ideal type, and that antitrust policy 
contributes to this variety rather than serving merely to correct markets that have strayed from the 
ideal type.”). 
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policies and practices by private actors are to be evaluated specifically 
according to whether they promote competition.  This is truly a far cry 
from the original classicist position on markets, according to which 
almost anything a private actor did in furtherance of interest was, ipso 
facto, competition.  The very idea that competition is a normative ideal 
separate from what firms actually do in furtherance of their economic 
self-interest makes space for affirmative state intervention (to bring 
affairs closer to that normative ideal).  To be sure, the classicists had a 
notion of legitimate and illegitimate competition, but that distinction 
was drawn on the basis of moral or normative concepts distinct from 
competition itself.  In the neoclassical framework, by contrast, 
competition itself is the normative benchmark used by antitrust.  In 
other words, the classical framework put bounds on the acts of market 
actors, but on the basis of conflict between competition and other 
normative ideals.  The neoclassical framework bounds the acts of 
market actors on the basis of ideal of competition itself.  That fact 
betrays the irreducible normative content of the concept of competition 
as it is used by contemporary courts, over and above the content of the 
concept of competition employed by classicist courts. 
The law of price-fixing is about preventing restraints on competition, 
or coordinated conduct that tends to have anti-competitive effects.  The 
reason that I say there is an irreducible normative component in its 
application is that some restraints on competition are always present in a 
market; they function as the walls within which competition will take 
place.  At the most basic level, these include all sorts of commercial 
regulation such as the rules defining and legally constituting the entities 
that will engage in competition, as well as industry-specific regulation.  
The goal of “maximizing competition” is simply not tenable, as a 
practical and logical matter, without incorporating some kind of limits. 
Then it is an unavoidable question what those appropriate limits, 
embodied for example in the scope of the price-fixing law, are.  The 
limits we actually have are arguably as much the result of historical 
accident as they are of rational economic science.  Thus, the logic of 
price-fixing has an inherent openness or indeterminacy, such that 
effectively extrinsic normative considerations are necessary to 
determine the precise circumstances under which concerted action to 
constrict supply of a given commodity is prohibited by antitrust law.  
The role these considerations play is rarely overt; courts typically fold 
them under the concepts of “maximizing competition” or “legitimate 
competition.” 
This is particularly so with respect to antitrust’s relationship to labor, 
which was formed under the pressure of normative considerations that 
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would likely not be endorsed openly by today’s courts.  That 
relationship raises a set of normative questions no matter how it is 
constituted—not only if labor is exempted from antitrust prosecution.  
One can imagine a whole variety of arrangements relating antitrust law 
to labor—from total subjection of worker collective action to price-
fixing, treating each worker as an individual firm, and with no labor 
exemption whatsoever, on one end; to a complete exemption for 
workers’ organizations with no restrictions, on the other.  Any of these 
arrangements would then simply become background legal facts; they 
would constitute the markets within which economic interactions take 
place. 
B.  Doctrinal Fault Lines 
In particular cases, courts make judgments about what circumstances 
define a commodity’s market price, and about whether some exception 
to the centrality of that normative ideal applies.  Courts engaging in 
neoclassical antitrust analysis make affirmative normative judgments—
whether overtly or implicitly—that are indispensable to their decision to 
continue to punish worker collective action by means of antitrust law.  
In this final Section, I explore the ways in which these normative 
considerations interact with the malleable logic of price-fixing, within 
three doctrinal pathways: (1) the wayward meaning of price-fixing 
itself, particularly in contexts that have direct implications for the 
regulation of worker collective action; (2) the operation of the 
“professional privilege” to shield certain types of workers and small 
producers from antitrust liability for concerted action; and (3) the basis 
on which First Amendment protection is denied to concerted action by 
workers unshielded by the labor exemption. 
1.  The Wayward Meaning of Price-Fixing 
“The statement ‘price-fixing is per se illegal’ is easy to say, but it 
immediately raises the problem of defining price-fixing.”244  While one 
might make the equivalent remark about any legal rule, it is no accident 
that the price-fixing doctrine draws it.  The meaning of price-fixing, and 
with it the rule, has taken wide pendulum swings over the course of the 
twentieth century, and the relative consolidation of a neoclassical 
consensus in the last quarter of that century has in some sense contained 
the seed of its own unraveling, opening the latest door for courts to take 
the broader perspective urged in this Article. 
 
244. HYLTON, supra note 13, at 117. 
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The “per se rule” is that certain activities are violations of the 
Sherman Act regardless of their actual effects on competition in the 
market (and to a certain extent regardless of intent).  The (modern) 
rationale is one of judicial and administrative economy: rather than 
tallying all the market effects in a particular case, some types of conduct 
are considered likely enough to be anti-competitive that they are 
deemed violations of the Sherman Act without requiring the plaintiff (or 
agency) to prove up the anti-competitive effects.  As courts consider 
new varieties of potential violations, more activities are incorporated 
into the per se rule, while certain categories of conduct (and new 
categories of conduct) remain subject to the “rule of reason.” 
The per se rule as to price-fixing itself was a stark departure from the 
common law, which probably enforced certain agreements that would 
now be considered criminal price-fixing.245  The rule was narrowly 
established early on in the Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n case.246  In 
Standard Oil, the Supreme Court moved away from the per se rule, and 
partially reinstated a reasonableness test even for express rate-setting 
agreements, encompassing considerations such as the purpose, power of 
the parties, and actual effects of the agreement.247  In Chicago Board of 
Trade, the Court again rejected the per se rule and made a distinction 
between restraints that “merely regulate and perhaps thereby promote 
competition” and those that “may suppress or even destroy 
competition.”248  This represented a halfway point between the 
common-law rule (a full-blown rule of reason, where even express 
restraints of trade could be valid if social benefits outweighed harms) 
and the per se rule, by creating the category of “regulating and 
promoting” competition.  In its initial form, the rule was probably closer 
 
245. The reason is that not only was price-fixing not a tort or crime under the common law, as 
already stated in Part II, supra, but also that the definition of price-fixing was very different: 
common-law courts expressly took into account not only whether the resultant prices were 
reasonable, but whether the competition-restricting agreement’s net social effect was positive: 
whether the “net effect, taking into account possible consumer benefits, is probably harmful to the 
public.”  Id. at 93.  This is in contrast to neoclassical price-fixing cases that expressly disavowed 
potential offsetting consumer benefits, not to mention potential “non-economic” social benefits. 
246. Id. at 90–94.  See generally United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 
372–73 (1897) (rejecting the common-law reasonableness standard and refusing to consider the 
defendants’ argument that the prices set were reasonable, apparently implying that contracts in 
restraint of trade might be reasonable overall). 
247. See generally Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (replacing the per se 
test with a reasonableness test); HYLTON, supra note 13, at 101–02 (discussing the decision in 
Standard Oil). 
248. Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); see also HYLTON, supra 
note 13, at 104–06 (discussing the decision in Chicago Board of Trade). 
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to the broad common-law rule of reason; it evolved considerably away 
from that as neoclassicism took greater hold.  Chicago Board of 
Trade—unlike some other cases from the period that took the rule 
further—actually remains good law.  The battle has been in applying the 
rule, in particular regarding the definition of “pro-competitive” and 
regarding the distinction between regulating competition in a manner 
that enables it (permissible) and restricts it (impermissible). 
Especially instructive is Appalachian Coals,249 which extended 
Chicago Board of Trade almost back to the common-law rule of reason 
analysis, holding that price-fixing does not intrinsically violate the 
Sherman Act if the benefits outweigh the harms, and taking a fairly 
broad view of the category of benefits that may be considered.  
Although not a labor case, the reasoning and facts of Appalachian Coals 
are of particular relevance to labor markets.  The Court’s reasoning was 
that in a market characterized by large, organized buyers that “created 
monopsonistic conditions on the demand side, depressing market 
prices,” an agreement to reduce or eliminate competition may be 
permissible.250  The Court cited several manifestations of “destructive 
competition” obtaining in the market for bituminous coal prior to the 
agreement between the sellers, all of them flowing from these 
monopsonistic conditions.251  This, of course, is the situation of many 
labor markets, particularly heightened by destructive competition on the 
product market side.252 
This doctrinal uncertainty was connected with and reflected the 
ideological and policy ambiguity already mentioned regarding the 
economic vision and policy of the New Deal era.  Overall, the market 
framework seemed to retain the upper hand ideologically, while the 
active management and containment of markets dominated policy on 
the ground.  For example, initially, the ICC, an agency that engaged in 
active economic policy-setting,253 wanted to allow rate agreements in 
various industries, while the Justice Department wanted to prosecute 
 
249. Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933). 
250. HYLTON, supra note 13, at 108. 
251. Appalachian Coals, 288 U.S. at 361–64. 
252. In fact, the Court noted the “destructive” labor market effects of ruinous competition in 
the bituminous coal market absent the agreement between the producers, as one of its 
justifications for allowing the agreement.  Id. at 364 (“[W]ages to labor have been substantially 
lessened.”).  The point I am making here is that the reasoning of Appalachian Coals can apply 
directly to labor markets, in addition to sometimes justifying price-fixing in an adjacent 
commodity market. 
253. See BELZER, supra note 33, at 55 (discussing the ICC). 
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them under the Sherman Act.254  The Reed-Bulwinkle Act, enacted in 
1948,255 ended this standoff by legalizing rate agreements among 
railroads and motor carriers as long as they were approved by the 
ICC.256  These industries were early strongholds of organized labor, and 
this compromise represented the temporary triumph of the tripartite 
economic governance of markets previously mentioned.  De facto rate 
setting, with a significant role for organized labor, in product markets 
characterized other key industries as well.257 
Eventually, of course, this tripartite model of economic governance 
was dismantled, with the “deregulation” policy that began in the 1970s, 
culminating in the actual dismantling of the ICC.  What Michael Belzer 
has called “deregulation policy” really consisted of changing the state’s 
role in economic governance, reducing its ability to directly engage in 
economic policy setting in the general interest,258 leaving it to other 
means (including directly regulating workers and imposing personal 
penalties), often to compensate for problems caused by rampant 
competition, the removal of any role for labor in economic governance, 
and the decimation of labor standards.259  For example, in trucking, the 
state role in the mid-century era was characterized by the ICC’s rate 
setting and other direct engagement in economic policy.  These 
essentially ensured a lack of undercutting among both firms and drivers, 
with the result that public safety was not a major problem.260  After 
 
254. HYLTON, supra note 13, at 97–98. 
255. Reed-Bulwinkle Act of 1948, ch. 491, 62 Stat. 472 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. 
§ 10706 (2012)). 
256. See HYLTON, supra note 13, at 98 (discussing the Reed-Bulwinkle Act); see also Belzer, 
supra note 33, at 59–61 (discussing the Reed-Bulwinkle Act). 
257. See, e.g., THOMAS GEOGHEGAN, Before the Lean Years, in WHICH SIDE ARE YOU ON?  
TRYING TO BE FOR LABOR WHEN IT’S FLAT ON ITS BACK 40, 40–58 (2004) (recounting the 
United Mine Workers’ critical role in coordinating the coal product market). 
258. For example, the policy of deregulation in the American trucking industry began in 1977 
when the ICC began to loosen the regulations that defined each carrier’s pricing.  BELZER, supra 
note 33, at 28.  Some companies failed; others began the pressure on their workers to cut wages.  
Id.  The policy was ratified by Congress, and took root in earnest, with the Motor Carrier Act of 
1980, which affirmed the earlier administrative deregulation of interstate trucking by removing 
regulatory barriers to enter into the market, eliminating indirect routings, and permitting 
discriminatory pricing (allowing discounts to high-volume customers).  Id.  For the first time 
since the 1930’s, below-cost rates were legal, enabling overt undercutting.  Id.  In 1994, Congress 
accomplished the deregulation of intrastate trucking as well, ordering states to stop regulating 
local trucking by enacting the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act.  Federal 
Aviation Administration Authorization Act, 49 U.S.C. 14501; see BELZER, supra note 33, at 28. 
259. See supra Part I.B, at notes 33–37 (describing the labor market effects of deregulation in 
trucking). 
260. BELZER, supra note 33, at 25. 
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“deregulation,” the state’s role took the form of a net of safety 
regulations governing drivers’ behavior.261  Business became the prime 
actor to directly set economic policy; in the case of trucking, these 
policy makers were primarily powerful economic actors in adjacent 
markets, such as retailers, who were increasingly linked to the global 
supply chain.  Thus “deregulation policy” really consisted in a 
profoundly changed, not eliminated, role of the state in economic life. 
The neoclassical turn on the policy level was mirrored in the price-
fixing doctrine, so that earlier cases that had extended Chicago Board of 
Trade to allow various forms of cooperative behavior were largely 
superseded.  Socony established that lack of market power is not even a 
defense to price-fixing, much less is market power an element of proof, 
thus prohibiting much cooperative conduct that might otherwise have 
been permitted.262  Thereafter came the rigid apex of the price-fixing 
doctrine, embodied especially in Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n 
and presaged in National Society of Professional Engineers, both 
decisions involving small producers and both authored by Justice 
Stevens.263  These decisions exemplify the post-Socony regime, which 
narrowed and clarified the ruling in Chicago Board of Trade.264  A 
decade and a half apart, Trial Lawyers can be seen as the natural 
completion of the logic of Professional Engineers: taking the willful 
blinders to relational market power, and to potential social and 
economic benefits of the concerted action, to a certain principled 
extreme. 
However, a contemporary revival of Appalachian Coals for labor 
markets is made possible by even more recent cases that seem to have 
again expanded both the scope and the meaning of rule of reason 
analysis.265  Thus, in our current moment “there are pressures to expand 
 
261. Id. at 67–72. 
262. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); see also HYLTON, supra 
note 13, at 109 (discussing the Socony case). 
263. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 424 
(1990) (refusing to consider social justifications and reasonableness of prices, in considering 
alleged price-fixing); see also Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693–
94 (1978) (refusing to consider public safety and other quality or consumer benefits as defense to 
alleged price-fixing). 
264. See Socony, 310 U.S. at 211–12 (narrowing the rule of reason so that only effects strictly 
tied to promoting market competition could be considered). 
265. See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 664 (3d. Cir. 1993) (allowing 
consideration of quality-enhancement arguments under the rule of reason, indicating a softening 
of the National Society of Professional Engineers approach); see also Broad. Music Inc. v. 
Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 22–24 (1979) (allowing an exception to price-fixing for the 
introduction of a new product). 
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rule of reason analysis” to justifications beyond strictly promoting 
market competition.266  So far, the benefits of any relaxation seem to 
have flowed mostly to large market actors, with small actors mostly left 
by the wayside.267  Some contemporary antitrust commentators, notably 
Warren Grimes, have argued that we ought to effectively return to the 
analysis of Appalachian Coals by considering relational market power 
as a basis for allowing concerted action among smaller, less powerful 
market actors—including, paradigmatically, 
professionals (such as doctors or lawyers) who practice individually or 
in small groups and must do business with power buyers of their 
services; small businesses (such as independent pharmacies or 
bookstore owners) . . . that confront power buyers and sellers; small 
franchisees . . . ; small farmers . . . ; and any independent contractor 
that sells services to a power buyer (such as a taxicab driver or a truck 
owner . . .).268 
The arc of the price-fixing doctrine demonstrates that it contains no 
inexorable logic requiring the prohibition of collective action by 
workers or other small economic actors who earn their income primarily 
through labor, and in fact contains materials to build a different 
approach. 
2.  The Professional Privilege 
In addition to the pliabilities in the concept of price-fixing just 
discussed, courts also sometimes invoke the status of sellers as members 
of one of the traditional professions, either to justify rule of reason 
rather than per se treatment, or as a consideration among others in the 
application of the rule of reason.  It is thus a privilege rather than an 
exemption, and its reach is fairly limited, particularly under the 
influence of neoclassicism—although we may see it expand under the 
same pressures mentioned relating to the rule of reason.  I mention it 
separately from the other pliabilities described above only because of its 
likely roots in very early trade regulation, and because the same 
privilege is not accorded to workers or sellers who lack the social and 
economic status of the professions.  Like all the pliabilities, it represents 
normative considerations outside neoclassical theory, but this set at 
once hearkens to animating ideals of pre-market economy trade 
 
266. HYLTON, supra note 13, at 109. 
267. Grimes, supra note 12, at 221–22. 
268. See id. at 196–97 (arguing antitrust should allow “countervailing power through the 
collective action of small buyers or sellers”). 
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regulation,269 and demonstrates the continuing thread of greater legal 
privilege within economic regulation accorded to those with greater 
social and economic status. 
The professions have, even in the heyday of neoclassical influence, 
remained at least partially staked out as a place where courts 
acknowledge that market forces may not be appropriate to determine all 
aspects of economic life.  It is thus one more way in which the price-
fixing doctrine on its own terms admits that market competition need 
not, and perhaps ought not, govern all of economic life, but, then, 
reserves the benefit of this restraint largely to socioeconomic elites.  For 
example, in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,270 although the Court 
rejected the wholesale exclusion of the learned professions from 
antitrust law (noting that lawyers are vital to commerce), it also treated 
as obvious the idea that the professions ought to be treated differently 
from other commercial actors, and perhaps with greater deference.  
Seemingly limiting its holding (allowing the possibility of antitrust 
liability) to the facts before it, the Court asserted: 
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished 
from a business is, of course, relevant in determining whether that 
particular restraint violates the Sherman Act.  It would be unrealistic 
to view the practice of professions as interchangeable with other 
business activities, and automatically to apply to the professions 
antitrust concepts which originated in other areas.  The public service 
aspect, and other features of the professions, may require that a 
particular practice, which could properly be viewed as a violation of 
the Sherman Act in another context, be treated differently.  We 
intimate no view on any other situation than the one with which we 
are confronted today.271 
This is a very clear statement that the professions ought to be treated 
differently from other producers or workers in applying the Sherman 
Act, and that greater deference is due their concerted action.  Yet 
workers outside the professions may also have legitimate claims to a 
more republican form of regulation of their economic activity. 
Moreover, considerations relating to the public interest may support 
those claims, both because of how poor working conditions affect 
matters such as public safety, and because of the ripple economic and 
social effects of poverty itself. 
 
269. See supra Part II.A, at notes 79–84 (discussing pre-classicist trade regulation). 
270. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). 
271. Id. at 78 n.17. 
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In fact, the professional privilege reflects the resilience, even in the 
face of neoclassicist ideology, of the deep-seated collective intuition 
that those who are doing the material work of economic life are entitled 
to a role in governing it and that indeed we all benefit when they do.  
The guild economy to which the professional privilege hearkens back 
was certainly organized around that supposition.272 
Although the neoclassical turn in antitrust doctrine certainly limited 
the professional privilege, the greater current porousness in the rule of 
reason offers the possibility of its re-expansion.  It is thus relevant both 
as a point of contrast to the law’s treatment of other workers, 
particularly low-wage workers, and as another doctrinal basis (if mostly 
by analogy) for excluding worker collective action from antitrust 
liability, or seriously limiting its scope. 
3.  First Amendment Protection for Worker Collective Action?: 
“Economic” and “Political” Protest 
The analysis of First Amendment protection for worker collective 
action (not immunized by the labor exemption) also demonstrates how 
essentially extrinsic normative considerations enter into antitrust 
doctrine.  In this case, an artificial distinction between the “economic” 
and the “political” keeps First Amendment protection for a classic 
workers’ boycott at bay. 
I have previously described Trial Lawyers as an instance of the 
neoclassical price-fixing logic applied to worker collective action that 
looms as a serious threat, if not an outright blockade, to much 
nontraditional worker organizing, particularly on the part of 
independent contractor workers not affiliated with a traditional labor 
organization.273  It is also a prime illustration of how courts may treat a 
First Amendment defense to antitrust liability for worker collective 
action.  In this case, the court of appeal had reversed the trial court’s 
finding of liability, reasoning that the expressive component of the 
boycott was protected by the First Amendment to the extent of 
nullifying the per se treatment, which would otherwise apply to a 
“classic restraint of trade.”  The court of appeal had imposed on the 
 
272. See supra Part II.A, at notes 79–84 (discussing pre-classicist trade regulation). 
273. In the case discussed here, the workers’ association did not try to claim softer treatment 
based on their status in the professions, nor on the basis of the labor exemption (despite using 
much of the language and strategy of traditional labor collective action in the actual conduct at 
issue).  This is not entirely surprising given the narrowness of the labor exemption as previously 
described, and the neoclassical tightening of the professional privilege, which would have been at 
its height. 
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FTC the requirement of showing “significant market power” on the part 
of the conspirators.  The Supreme Court first agreed with the court of 
appeal that “this constriction of supply is the essence of ‘price-fixing,’ 
whether it be accomplished by agreeing upon a price . . . or by agreeing 
upon an output, which will increase the price offered.”274  It then 
rejected both the association’s First Amendment argument based on 
Claiborne Hardware, which urged that even if the conduct violated the 
Sherman Act it was protected as an expressive boycott, and the court of 
appeal’s First Amendment reasoning based on O’Brien, which had held 
that the expressive components of the conduct warranted rule of reason 
treatment (inviting a consideration of market power and reasonableness 
of prices).275 
In distinguishing Claiborne Hardware, the Court places “equal 
respect” and “equal treatment” beyond the market, and reasoned that the 
First Amendment protects concerted action, including collective 
refusals to deal, as long as they are aimed at securing such “equal 
respect” and “equal treatment.”276  “Equality and freedom are 
preconditions of the free market, and not commodities to be haggled 
over within it.”277  As if by poetic contrast, the opinion immediately 
goes on: “The same cannot be said of attorney’s fees.”278  The Court 
dwelled little on the material reality of the lawyers’ lives, instead 
immediately going on to characterize them as “business competitors 
who stand to profit financially from a lessening of competition in the 
boycotted market.”279  This account essentially characterized pay for 
personal labor as “financial profit,” a result that is compelling neither on 
neoclassical economic theory nor on a broader view of human labor.  
Remember that the conduct specifically being sanctioned here was 
simply the collective refusal to work: the closest resemblance in perhaps 
all the price-fixing case law to classic labor concerted action.  Indeed, 
that the lawyers had little else to leverage but their personal labor, 
which was therefore really all they owned, is evidenced by the fact that 
that is exactly what they did.  Note that it was generally agreed that the 
fees were reasonable and a better public policy in terms of the defense 
of indigent clients provided by the lawyers.280  There is an irony in the 
 
274. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 423 (1990). 
275. Id. at 426–36 (citing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982)). 
276. Id. at 426. 
277. Id. 
278. Id. 
279. Id. at 423. 
280. Various court and bar committees that had been convened to study the issue, and likely 
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fact that the articulation of the apex of the neoclassical logic of price-
fixing—which must ultimately ground itself in the idea that markets, 
defined by self-interested economic action, ought to be the basis for 
organizing all economic life—would seem to moralize about relatively 
low-income, low-status attorneys taking action in their economic self-
interest.281 
Secondly, there is a circularity in asserting that equality to which one 
is “constitutionally entitled”282 is beyond the reach of the market, in 
order to answer the question to what is one constitutionally entitled.  In 
fact, the only way to avoid that circularity is to acknowledge that, of 
course, we are actually discussing two different constitutional questions: 
whether the object of the boycott is constitutionally protected (in the 
case of Claiborne Hardware,283 by the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments) and whether the boycott is constitutionally protected (by 
the First Amendment).  Certainly, race discrimination is prohibited by 
the Constitution,284 while low attorneys’ fees, and even poverty wages, 
are not.  But is the rule really that an expressive boycott is entitled to 
First Amendment protection only if its object is constitutionally 
protected?  Clearly, that is not the rule.  Perhaps what the Court meant 
to say instead is that the object of a constitutionally protected boycott 
cannot be an affirmatively illegitimate one, as defined by antitrust.  
Note, though, that this too compares apples and oranges: seeking higher 
attorneys’ fees (putting aside for the moment whether they should be 
characterized as financial profit or pay for labor) is not, as a purpose for 
action, illegal under the antitrust laws.  The conduct as a whole must be 
analyzed under the antitrust laws to make a determination about 
legitimacy.  Put aside even that issue and assume the lawyers’ conduct 
did violate the Sherman Act.  To rely upon that alone is simply to 
eviscerate the constitutional limits on antitrust when it comes to 
expressive boycotts.  One can imagine, in other words, a rule that the 
 
the political branches of the District of Columbia as well, endorsed the higher rates as a policy 
matter, citing in particular the impact upon the quality of representation.  Id. at 444–46. 
281. It is, perhaps, the smallest whiff of the double standard that the market framework seems 
to embody when plumbed deeply enough in any one place: freedom and self-interest for the 
haves, morality and self-denial for the have-nots. 
282. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 426. 
283. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982). 
284. This is putting aside an issue that the opinion glosses over—that the Constitution does 
not literally guarantee the aims of the Claiborne Hardware boycotters, to the extent that the 
underlying wrongs did not involve state action.  Presumably, the Court is relying upon the 
constitutional principle to distinguish between the aims of the two sets of boycotters.  However, 
this issue further highlights the lack of clarity around what that principle is. 
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First Amendment only protects expressive boycotts that would not 
otherwise be violations of the antitrust laws.  Perhaps all the foregoing 
complexities serve to avoid stating such a bold rule outright.  We will 
never really know, because the Court dispensed with the Claiborne 
Hardware argument on the basis of what it painted as an extreme 
contrast between the objects of the two sets of concerted action 
(constitutionally hallowed on one end, illegal on the other end). 
The Court also seemed to rely partially on its relatively offhand, 
closing statement that Claiborne Hardware does not protect economic 
boycotts, distinguishing those from the “peaceful, political activity” 
involved in the earlier case.285  But this distinction is not tenable.  
Boycotts by definition involve an economic act: the collective refusal to 
buy or sell, in an attempt to influence some specific behavior of the one 
from whom one has been buying or selling.  The two cases are not 
distinguishable in any salient respect as to their employment of this 
means.  The other points of comparison are the objects of the means 
employed, and any other means used.  As for the latter, the Court 
conceded that the lawyers engaged in various expressive activity that 
was political in nature.  In the lawyers’ case, the Court separated this 
conduct from the economic boycott;286 yet, in the civil rights 
boycotters’ case, the Court ran this conduct together with the concerted 
refusal to buy.287  As for the purposes of the boycotts, the rule would 
then have to be that boycotts aimed at bringing economic benefits to the 
boycotters288 are not entitled to First Amendment protection.  Surely 
this cannot be the rule, since many of the benefits sought by the 
boycotters in Claiborne Hardware were also economic in nature.  To be 
sure, those economic benefits were grounded in a claim for racial 
justice, but if that (or some other constitutionally protected value) is the 
requirement, then we are back at the circular argument just described. 
The Trial Lawyers Court then turned to the court of appeal’s 
reasoning that even if not protected wholesale, the lawyers’ conduct was 
entitled to a softened rule of reason treatment due to the First 
Amendment implications.289  The Court rejected this partially on the 
 
285. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 428. 
286. See, e.g., id. at 431 (“[T]his level of expression is not an element of the boycott.”). 
287. Id. at 428. 
288. Emphasizing its economic aspects, the Court calls what the lawyers sought variously 
“attorneys fees,” “special advantage,” “economic[] advantage,” “[financial] profit.”  Id. at 427–
28.  The idea of “special advantage,” again, implies a counterfactual embedded with normative 
assumptions.  Id. 
289. Id. at 429. 
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basis of the same distinction between the economic and the political that 
it mentioned in its rejection of the Claiborne Hardware argument, but 
also on the basis of an analysis of the role of market power in price-
fixing analysis.290  The former, as just described, is based upon an 
artificial and selective separation of the expressive and the economic 
components of the concerted action, which in turn points up the 
artificiality of the distinction in the first place.  The latter is based on a 
perhaps exaggerated solidity of the “rule of law” that the lawyers 
supposedly violated.291 
Even most theorists who assume that antitrust should strictly 
implement economic theory would say that refusing to consider market 
power is not the best implementation of what that theory would 
prescribe.292  The Court skirted this conclusion.  It certainly relied upon 
what it characterized as the massive administrative inconvenience of 
analyzing market power.  At the same time, it insisted that “the per se 
rules also reflect a longstanding judgment that the prohibited practices 
by their nature have ‘a substantial potential for impact on 
competition.’”293  The analogy chosen was an odd one: 
 The per se rules in antitrust law serve purposes analogous to per se 
restrictions upon, for example, stunt flying in congested areas or 
speeding . . . . Perhaps most violations of such rules actually cause no 
harm.  No doubt many experienced drivers and pilots can operate 
much more safely, even at prohibited speeds, than the average citizen. 
 . . . Yet the laws may nonetheless be enforced against these skilled 
persons without proof that their conduct was actually harmful or 
dangerous.294 
 
290. Id. at 430–36. 
291. These points are also made in Justice Brennan’s dissent, which endorses the court of 
appeal’s application of the rule of reason, because that is appropriate in cases of expressive 
boycotts that have both First Amendment and antitrust implications.  Id. at 437–52 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting).  The dissent reasons that the per se rule is a presumption (almost by definition, some 
practices banned by it would pass the rule of reason), and that in a First Amendment case, the 
government cannot apply broad presumptions (that certain categories of speech are harmful) 
without engaging in a more particularized examination.  Id.  The dissent emphasizes the history 
of boycotts, and adduces facts specific to this boycott in particular, that show it or them to be in 
essence a political, rather than or in addition to an economic, tactic to change behavior.  Id.  It 
emphasizes that the expressive component of an expressive boycott is inseparable from the 
boycott activity, rejecting the compartmentalization of the majority’s analysis (and rejecting the 
idea that the minimal expression inherent in every boycott is what makes it fall in the expressive 
category).  Id. 
292. See, e.g., HYLTON, supra note 13, at 114 (suggesting that market power should be 
considered in analyzing antitrust violations). 
293. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 433 (majority opinion). 
294. Id. 
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But the point is that a group of competitors with insufficient market 
power don’t pose a risk at all, not that the risk is potential but not actual, 
as it is with obviously and inherently dangerous activity (stunt flying in 
traffic).  It is fairly evident that the lawyers lacked such “relational” 
market power: the market was characterized by a single large, organized 
buyer.  The same idea—monopsony—motivated Appalachian Coals but 
had since been largely abandoned by the courts.  The results of this 
imbalance of market power were depressed rates of pay that no one on 
the ground seriously thought were fair, sustainable, or good policy. 
As the deregulation era marches ever forward, bringing with it the 
continued growth of nontraditional work, the rigidities and tensions of 
the approach to worker collective action embodied in Trial Lawyers are 
likely to become more dramatically exposed.  If so, we will also be 
presented with the opportunity to consider that approach afresh.   
CONCLUSION 
My aim here has been to trace the history of an idea: the application 
of antitrust liability to worker collective action.  The situation of today’s 
independent contractor workers, who face antitrust liability for engaging 
in collective action aimed at improving wages and working conditions, 
starkly confronts us with this issue, and with the deeper questions about 
the relationship between market regulation and labor regulation that it 
raises.   
The suggestion that I have tried to make is simply that we should 
reevaluate this rule, and that in doing so, we ought to engage in a truly 
new examination of the values implicated, freed from the default 
assumptions—largely accidents of history—that have mostly dogged 
discussions of the matter.  Such an examination may include, to be sure, 
costs that might result from very strong labor combinations in certain 
markets.  But it also must include the benefits that would result from 
recognizing and honoring the expression of human agency that worker 
collective action is, as well as the social, economic, and moral value of 
decent working conditions and decent wages for work. 
Nothing in the core logic of modern antitrust law constrains courts or 
legislatures from such a reconsideration; in fact, the peculiar history of 
the default rule examined in this Article demands it.  In future work, I 
will further explore the republican origins of the Sherman Act itself as a 
potential source for developing a set of considerations that might 
replace the default rule.  To clear the space for that work, I hope to have 
shown that the apparent logical inevitability of the status quo, which 
would bring the heavy hammer of the Sherman Act down on worker 
collective action almost without exception, is illusory. 
